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SECTION 501(c)(3) EXEMPTION OF RELIGIOUS
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Nicholas A. Mirkay*
INTRODUCTION
In the last several decades, religious organizations have come to occupy an
enviable legal stature in American society, leading one legal scholar to comment
that "separation of church and state is no longer the law of the land."' According
to one analysis, religious organizations received over two hundred exemptions and
other regulatory benefits in federal legislation over the last eighteen years, covering
a wide array of areas such as pensions, immigration, and land use.2 One special
break enacted to prevent religious discrimination in local zoning not only eliminated
the discrimination, but also provided churches with the ability to discriminate against
other landowners.3 Beginning with a policy shift in 1996 under President Bill Clinton
and continuing under President George W. Bush's Faith Based Initiative, religious
organizations' receipt of state and federal government grants and contracts has steadily
increased.4 In addition to these more recently bestowed benefits, religious organiza-
tions, including churches, enjoy a longstanding exemption from federal income tax as
"charitable organizations"5 and are aprimary beneficiary of the charitable contributions
* Associate Professor of Law, Widener University School of Law, Wilmington, Delaware;
J.D., University of Missouri-Columbia School of Law; LL.M., Georgetown University Law
Center. Special thanks to Michelle Arnopol Cecil, Roberta Mann, and Alan Garfield for their
review and insightful comments. Thanks also to the following individuals: Stephen Scibetta
for his invaluable research and editing assistance, Carol Perrupato for her indispensable admin-
istrative assistance, and Alan and Noah Gardner for their love and support during the research
and writing of this Article. Any remaining errors or omissions are mine alone.
' Diana B. Henriques, As Exemptions Grow, Religion Outweighs Regulation, N.Y. TIMEs,
Oct. 8, 2006, at Al [hereinafter Henriques, Exemptions Grow] (quoting John Witte, Jr.,
Director of the Center for the Study of Law and Religion at the Emory University Law School).
2 Id.
' Id. The Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act of 2000 provided churches
with a greater ability to challenge local zoning decisions in court. Pub. L. No. 106-274, 114
Stat. 803 (codified in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.). Professor Marci A. Hamilton, who
calls for increased consideration of religious exemptions, commented that the Act gave "such
an expansive remedy that not only are [churches] not getting discriminated against, but they
are now capable of discriminating against all other landowners." Henriques, Exemptions
Grow, supra note 1.
4 Henriques, Exemptions Grow, supra note 1.
5 See Nicholas A. Mirkay, Is It "Charitable" to Discriminate? The Necessary Trans-
formation of Section 501(c)(3) into the Gold Standard for Charities, 2007 WIS. L. REv. 45,
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deduction.6 In 2006, that deduction alone cost the federal government $40 billion in
lost revenue and outweighed government expenditures on public lands' preservation,
environmental protection, and new energy development.7
In addition to the above benefits, additional exemptions and benefits have been
proposed in pending congressional legislation. One such bill, the Houses of Worship
Free Speech Restoration Act of 2005, would amend the Internal Revenue Code (Code)
to exempt churches and "other houses of worship ' 8 from the political campaign activity
prohibition in § 501(c)(3).9 The Workplace Religious Freedom Act of 2005 would
amend the Civil Rights Act of 196410 to require employers "to initiat[e] and engage]
in an affirmative and bona fide effort, to reasonably accommodate" the religious prac-
tices of employees. " Another congressional bill would amend the Higher Education
Act to prevent educational accreditation boards from requiring private religious
schools to comply with applicable state and local nondiscrimination laws.'2 Most
recently, religious organizations would be exempt from the prohibition on sexual
56-60 [hereinafter Mirkay, Charities & Discrimination], for a discussion of the meaning of
"charitable" under § 501 (c)(3) of the Internal Revenue Code and the common practice of col-
lectively referring to the entities listed in the statute (e.g., religious, educational, scientific, etc.)
as "charitable." This Article uses the terms "charitable organization," "religious organization,"
and "tax-exempt organization" to refer to nonprofit organizations that qualify for, and have
been granted, an exemption from federal income tax. See generally I.R.C. § 501 (c)(3) (2000)
(explaining eligibility for these tax benefits). In addition, the terms "exemption" and "tax-
exempt status" refer exclusively to federal income tax law and do not imply exemption under
other federal tax laws, or under state or local laws, unless otherwise indicated.
6 I.R.C. § 170(c)(2) (2000); see Ellen P. Aprill, Churches, Politics, and the Charitable
Contribution Deduction, 42 B.C. L. REV. 843, 845 (2001) (reporting that religious organi-
zations received sixty percent of all charitable contributions made in 1998, which represented
the "largest share of any category of charitable organizations, as well as the largest average
contribution, $1,002" (citation omitted)).
' Stephanie Strom, Big Gifts, Tax Breaks and a Debate on Charity, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 6,
2007, at Al.
B Houses of Worship Free Speech Restoration Act of 2005, H.R. 235, 109th Cong. (2005);
see Diana B. Henriques, In the Congressional Hopper: A Long Wish List of Special Benefits
and Exemptions, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 11,2006, at A20 [hereinafter Henriques, Long Wish List];
see also Religious Freedom Act of 2006, S. 3957, 109th Cong. (2006); Diane Freda, Inhofe
Measure Introduced to Allow Clergy to Speak Out on Political Issues, 189 DAILY TAX REP.
(BNA) G-7 (Sept. 29, 2006).
9 Unless otherwise indicated, all "Section" references herein are to the Internal Revenue
Code of 1986, as amended.
'0 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(j) (2000).
" Workplace Religious Freedom Act of 2005, H.R. 1445, 109th Cong. (2005); see also
Henriques, Long Wish List, supra note 8.
12 See Paul Johnson, Congress Moves to Except Religious Schoolsfrom Gay Rights Laws,
365GAY.coM, Apr. 18,2006, available at Posting of Bill Howe to NAMEblog, http://nameorg
.org/pipermail/name-mce nameorg.org/2006-April/000889.html (Apr. 26, 2006, 11:02 EDT).
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orientation discrimination in the workplace under the Employment Non-Discrimination
Act of 2007.13
On the state and local levels, religious organizations also typically enjoy lucrative
real property tax exemptions. 4 For example, in Colorado, religiously owned real prop-
erty valued at more than $1 billion was exempt from local property taxes in 2006."5
These exemptions are being extended as religious organizations expand their mission
to encompass multimedia operations, biblical theme parks, retirement communities,
child care facilities, fitness centers, bookstores, and coffee shops.' 6 Considering these
expanded missions, the propriety of religious organizations' tax exemption is being
questioned 7 given that these organizations still depend on, and consume, the same
public services as taxpaying citizens, effectively shifting the cost of providing those
public services onto those citizens. 8
The propriety of the extensive tax and other legal exemptions enjoyed by religious
organizations must further be questioned when they maintain discriminatory policies
or engage in discriminatory practices.' 9 Discrimination can be legally defined as "a
failure to treat all persons equally when no reasonable distinction can be found be-
tween those favored and those not favored."' Based on that definition, religious orga-
nizations discriminate not only in the employment context, which is legally sanctioned
in certain circumstances, 2 but also in services or activities considered part of their
religious mission, such as education.22 Many of the discriminatory acts and policies
involve affiliated schools and universities that (I) terminated employees for questioning
or violating church doctrine on sexual orientation or marital status, (ii) expelled
"3 Employment Non-Discrimination Act of 2007, H.R. 3685, 110th Cong. (2007); see
also H.R. 2015, 110th Cong. § 6 (2007) (including gender identity as a protected class); Vote
On ENDA Delayed as LGBTPressure Mounts, 365Gay.com, Oct. 1, 2007, available at Posting
of 365GAY.coM Newscenter Staff to Ray's List, http://rayslistglbtnews.blogspot.com/2007
09_30_archive.html (Oct. 1, 2007, 19:00 EST) (stating support for legislation banning
discrimination).
14 See generally Diana B. Henriques, As Religious Programs Expand, Disputes Rise Over
Tax Breaks, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 10, 2006, at Al [hereinafter Henriques, Religious Programs]
(describing various real property tax breaks for church-held property).
1" Id. The total forgone property tax revenue on religiously owned real property is not avail-
able, nor is how much of that forgone revenue is shifted to other taxpaying landowners. Id.
16 Id. Whether these expanded activities are exempt from applicable property taxes typically
depends on the state's definition or concept of "charity." Id.
17 See id. (describing discontentment in communities about some charitable tax deductions).
18 Henriques, Exemptions Grow, supra note 1. The total national cost of providing such
public services is not readily known. Id.
1" See infra text accompanying notes 24-40 (discussing various discriminatory practices
of religious organizations).
20 BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 500 (8th ed. 2004).
21 See infra notes 194-95 and accompanying text.
22 See Henriques, Religious Programs, supra note 14.
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students for their alleged or announced gay sexual orientation, or (iii) maintained
employment and admissions standards that discriminated on the basis of sexual orien-
tation or marital status.23 Consider some additional recent examples:
1. Massachusetts Roman Catholic bishops requested that Catholic Charities and
Catholic social service agencies be granted an exemption from the state's anti-discrim-
ination law that permits gay and lesbian individuals to adopt children.24 The four
Roman Catholic bishops in the state asserted that the law violated their constitutionally
granted religious freedom.' Eight members of the Catholic Charities board eventually
resigned in protest of the bishops' position.26 The Roman Catholic Archdiocese of
San Francisco has similarly made statements that its Catholic Charities agency "will
no longer allow same-sex couples to adopt children," threatening its receipt of $5.8
million in state and local government funding.27
2. A Jewish university withdrew financial support for the student club, Gay-
Straight Alliance, and barred the organization from using the university's name.2' A
university officer stated that gay lifestyle did not comport with "observant Judaism"
and the university's values.29 Similarly, a Roman Catholic-affiliated medical college
opposed recognition of a gay and lesbian club because it would "'advocate and pro-
mote activities inconsistent with the values of the college. "30
3. A physician filed suit against his employer, a Roman Catholic-affiliated
hospital, for its refusal to grant his life partner coverage under its employee health
insurance policy.3' The physician and the hospital maintain conflicting viewpoints on
the applicability of Connecticut's civil union statute to the dispute.32 The hospital
defends its decision as complying with the Roman Catholic Church's "'teachings,
principals [sic] and ethical directives." 33
23 See Mirkay, Charities & Discrimination, supra note 5, at 48-50.
24 See Uproar In Boston Over Gay Adoptions, CBS NEWS, Mar. 2, 2006, http://www
.cbsnews.con/stories/2006/03/02/national/mainl 361889.shtml?source=search story; see also
Jonathan Saltzman, Romney Eyes Bill Exempting Religious Groups on Bias Laws, BOSTON
GLOBE, Mar. 11, 2006, at A4.
' Boston Archdiocese Stops Adoption Work, CBS NEWS, Mar. 11, 2006, http://www
.cbsnews.com/stories/2006/03/1 l/national/main 1391621 .shtml?source=search-story.
26 Id.
27 Wyatt Buchanan, Archdiocese Halts Same-Sex Adoptions at Catholic Charities;
Spokesman Points to Stance Taken by New Archbishop, S.F. CHRON., Mar. 21, 2006, at B2.
28 See Chris G. Denina, Gay Club Loses Touro OK, VALL JO TIMES HERALD (Cal.),
Sept. 29, 2006, at Al.
29 id.
30 Andy Newman, Westchester Not Examining Barring of Gay Student Club, N.Y. TIMES,
Mar. 31, 2005, at B4 (quoting statement from New York Medical College).
31 Michael Puffer, Gay Complaint May Pit State Against Church, WATERBURY
REPUBLiCAN-AM. (Conn.), Feb. 5, 2006, available at http://www.freerepublic.com/focus/
f-news/1572459/posts.
32 See id. (stating that the couple believed the hospital was compelled to cover the couple
because Connecticut recognized civil unions).
"' Id. (quoting Robert Ritz, President and CEO of Saint Mary's Hospital).
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4. An evangelical Christian-owned university that encouraged a part-time
professor to apply for a full-time position allegedly rejected her for being openly
gay. 4 The university's president explained that the university only hired Christians
who observed the church's principles, one of which stated that only heterosexuals
should marry and have sexual relations.35
5. A Roman Catholic all-girls secondary school compelled two lesbian employees
to resign or be fired after they distributed invitations to their commitment ceremony.36
6. A full professor resigned from a non-denominational evangelical Protestant
college rather than conform to the college's longstanding policy on divorced employ-
ees. 37 Under that policy, the professor would have been required to discuss the terms
of his divorce with the college to determine whether his marital dissolution fell within
what the college deemed to be acceptable biblical parameters.38
7. A Roman Catholic-affiliated university rejected adding sexual orientation to
its stated nondiscrimination policy that applied to the hiring and promotion of fac-
ulty and staff as well as student admissions.39 A statement issued by the university's
trustees explained that the inclusion of sexual orientation in its policy could restrain its
ability to "'make decisions that are necessary to support Catholic church teaching."'
The paramount issue raised by these examples of discrimination is continued
federal governmental support4' of the religious organizations via tax-exempt status
31 See Angela Rozas, North Park Sued; Sex Bias Charged; Gay ProfessorAccuses College,
CHI. TRIB., Dec. 4, 2003, at C2.
31 Id.; North Park Accused of Discrimination, CHI. TRIB., Dec. 4, 2003, at 6.
36 Manuela Da Costa-Femandes, Lesbians' Firing Fuels Outrage, NEW HAVEN REG.,
July 2,2002, available at http://www.nhregister.com/articles/2002/07/02/import/46197 10.txt.
3' Elizabeth Redden, Divorce: GroundsforDismissal, INSIDE HIGHERED., Apr. 25, 2008.
38 Id.
'9 Chuck Colbert, Notre Dame Blew It on Discrimination Policy, NAT'L CATHOLIC REP.,
Mar. 26, 1999, available athttp://natcath.org/NCROnline/archives2/1999a/032699/032699k
.htm. In contrast, the anti-discrimination policy of Saint Louis University, a Catholic Jesuit
university specifically states: "Based on our Catholic values and tradition we are committed
to protecting the dignity of each person and therefore extend our nondiscrimination policy
to include sexual orientation." Saint Louis University Antidiscrimination Policy, available at
http://www.slu.edu/organizations/rainbow/slu-policy.html. Similarly, Boston College, also
a Catholic Jesuit university, provides that it is the policy of the college
to comply with all state and federal laws prohibiting discrimination in
employment and in its educational programs on the basis of a person's
race, religion, color, national origin, age [sic] sex, marital or parental
status, veteran status, or disability, and to comply with state law pro-
hibiting discrimination on the basis of a person's sexual orientation.
Notice of Nondiscrimination, Boston College Office for Institutional Diversity, available at
http://www.bc.edu/offices/diversity/compliance/nondiscrinthtml (last visited Nov. 23, 2008).
o Colbert, supra note 39 (quoting statement of Notre Dame trustees).
'" For further discussion on the equivalence of tax exemption and the charitable con-
tributions deduction to "subsidies" or direct government grants of money, see Mirkay,
Charities & Discrimination, supra note 5, at 79-82; see also David A. Brennen, Tax
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and a charitable contributions deduction for their donors.a2 Current federal income
tax law does not explicitly prohibit discrimination by religious organizations." "The
only possible restraint on discrimination exists in the public-policy doctrine enun-
ciated by the U.S. Supreme Court in Bob Jones University v. United States, which
granted the Treasury Department (and the IRS by delegation) the power to revoke the
tax-exempt status of an organization whose purpose violates 'established public
policy.'"' However, the IRS has used the doctrine to revoke tax-exempt status only
in instances where the "organizations... participated in racial discrimination, advo-
cated civil disobedience, or involved themselves in an illegal activity. '45 Despite its
merits, the doctrine's main failure is its lack of a clearly defined source of "established
public policy."46 For instance, based on examples of discrimination provided herein,
does discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation or marital status violate an estab-
lished public policy?47 Legal scholars differ in their conclusions. 48 Furthermore,
Expenditures, Social Justice, and Civil Rights: Expanding the Scope of Civil Rights Laws to
Apply to Tax-Exempt Charities, 2001 BYU L. REv. 167, 173, 208-25 [hereinafter Brennen,
Tax Expenditures] (discussing both the legal effects of economic equivalence and the consti-
tutional equivalence tax expenditure theories).
42 Religious organizations are typically exempt from federal income taxation pursuant
to § 501(c)(3). I.R.C. § 501(c)(3) (2000). As eligible organizations described in § 170(c)(2),
religious organizations may receive tax-deductible charitable contributions pursuant to § 170(a).
I.R.C. § 170(a), (c)(2)(B) (2000).
13 See Mirkay, Charities & Discrimination, supra note 5, at 51; see also Brennen, Tax
Expenditures, supra note 41, at 169.
4 Mirkay, Charities & Discrimination, supra note 5, at 51 (quoting Bob Jones Univ. v.
United States, 461 U.S. 574, 586 (1983)).
41 Id.; see also David A. Brennen, The Power of the Treasury: Racial Discrimination,
Public Policy, and "Charity" in Contemporary Society, 33 U.C. DAvIs L. REv. 389, 391 n.2
(2000) [hereinafter Brennen, Racial Discrimination] (citing Rev. Rul. 75-384, 1975-2 C.B.
204; Rev. Rul. 71-447, 1971-2 C.B. 230; I.R.S. Gen. Couns. Mem. 39,862 (Dec. 2, 1991)).
4 Mirkay, Charities & Discrimination, supra note 5, at 51, 67; see also Brennen, Racial
Discrimination, supra note 45, at 403-04, 407, 439 (describing the problems surrounding
defining "established public policy").
47 See Mirkay, Charities and Discrimination, supra note 5, at 51 (asking if this policy
extends to include sexual orientation or marital status).
48 Id.; see also Gay Rights Coal. of Georgetown Univ. Law Ctr. v. Georgetown Univ., 536
A.2d 1, 38-39 (D.C. Ct. App. 1987) (holding that Georgetown University violated a District
of Columbia law prohibiting an educational institution from discriminating against an indi-
vidual on the basis of sexual orientation, and concluding that the "eradication of sexual orien-
tation discrimination is a compelling governmental interest"); BRUCE R. HoPKINs, THE LAW
OF TAX-EXEMPT ORGANIZATIONS § 6.2(d) (9th ed. 2007) ("It may also be quite validly asserted
that there is a federal public policy, either presently in existence or in the process of develop-
ment, against other forms of discrimination, such as discrimination on the basis of marital
status, national origin, religion, handicap, sexual preference, and age." (citation omitted)).
But cf. Michael Hatfield et al., Bob Jones University: Defining Violations of Fundamental
Public Policy, in 6 Topics IN PHILANTHROPY 1, 86-87 (2000), available at http://wwwl.law
720 [Vol. 17:715
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critics routinely comment that the public policy doctrine places too much discretion
in a regulatory agency.'
In a prior article, I proposed a solution to the problem of discrimination by chari-
table organizations (a term commonly interpreted to include religious organizations) ° -
enact a broad and well-defined nondiscrimination requirement in § 501 (c)(3).51 This
nondiscrimination provision would be based on currently existing language in the fed-
eral civil rights laws, but "expanded to include the bases on which charitable organiza-
tions most commonly discriminate": sexual orientation and marital status.52 "Inherent
in this proposal is the notion that any discrimination by a charitable organization is
intrinsically incompatible with that organization's charitable purpose and mission."53
The inclusion of a nondiscrimination requirement directly in the statute that grants tax-
exempt status sends a strong and symbolic message to potential and existing charitable
organizations that discriminatory policies and practices are intrinsically inconsistent
.nyu.edu/ncpl/library/publications/Monograph2000BobJones.pdf (concluding that there is
no "fundamental national public policy against sexual orientation discrimination").
49 See Brennen, Tax Expenditures, supra note 41, at 186-87; Brennen, Racial Discrim-
ination, supra note 45, at 411-28, 446; Charles 0. Galvin & Neal Devins, A Tax Policy
Analysis ofBob Jones University v. United States, 36 VAND. L. REv. 1353, 1372-73 (1983).
50 See Mirkay, Charities & Discrimination, supra note 5. The Supreme Court's decision in
Bob Jones University v. United States, 461 U.S. 574 (1983), solidified the view that a common
law "charitable" overlay to all exempt organizations described in § 501(c)(3) existed. Id. at
585-86. It noted that in order to qualify for exempt status thereunder, an organization must
(1) fall within one of the eight categories set forth in the statute, and (2) demonstrate that its
activities are not contrary to established public policy. Id. at 585. In rejecting the university's
argument that the eight categories in § 501(c)(3) are disjunctive and, therefore, that an organi-
zation need not also qualify as "charitable" to be tax-exempt, the Court explained that Congress
intended that "entitlement to tax exemption depends on meeting certain common-law standards
of charity-namely, that an institution.., must serve a public purpose and not be contrary
to established public policy." Id. at 586; see also John Witte, Jr., Tax Exemption of Church
Property: HistoricalAnomaly or Valid Constitutional Practice?, 64 S. CAL. L. REv. 363,376
n.49 (1991) (discussing the historical evolution and eventual inclusion of "religious use" of
property into "charitable use"); cf Miriam Galston, Public Policy Constraints On Charitable
Organizations, 3 VA. TAX REv. 291, 292 (1984) (arguing the debate should be narrowed to
consider policy considerations of §§ 501(c)(3) and 170, not the policy as a whole).
"' Mirkay, Charities & Discrimination, supra note 5, at 52, 84. For recent examples of
discrimination by charitable and religious organizations, see supra notes 24-43 and accom-
panying text, and Mirkay, Charities & Discrimination, supra note 5, at 48-50.
52 Mirkay, Charities & Discrimination, supra note 5, at 84. Any statutorily imposed
nondiscrimination requirement should address the intended meaning of "discrimination" with
respect to discriminatory organizations that otherwise operate exclusively for exempt purposes
under § 501(c)(3). Id. at 103-04 ("Ultimately, whether or not a particular policy or action
constitutes discrimination would depend on a facts-and-circumstances determination, with
standards and burdens of proof borrowed from established civil-rights laws and other nondis-
crimination statutes.").
13 Id. at 84.
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with tax-exempt status under § 501(c)(3). 54 More precisely, "nondiscriminatory prac-
rices and policies comport with the commonly accepted notion of being 'charitable'
and conferring public benefit.",55 Although an organization that discriminates would
lose its § 501(c)(3) tax exemption under the proposal, it may still qualify for tax ex-
emption under § 501(c)(4) as a "social welfare organization. '56 However, social wel-
fare organizations do not qualify for the § 170 charitable contributions deduction,57
thereby preventing offending organizations from using tax-deductible donations that
they receive to discriminate against members of society.58
Nevertheless, applying a nondiscrimination requirement to religious organizations
is perplexing because federal income tax law does not define "religious" or "religion"
due primarily to First Amendment concerns.59 Because the IRS is acutely aware of the
constitutional minefield surrounding any attempt to define "religion" or "religious,"
or "church," it therefore opts for a broad interpretation.' For federal income tax law
purposes, religious organizations are generally defined more broadly than "churches"
or "houses of worship," and can include schools and universities, social service agen-
cies, publishers, broadcasters, and cemeteries.6 However, with respect to churches,
some designation is necessary because of the unique treatment and protection the
Code accords to "churches, their integrated auxiliaries, and conventions or associa-
tions of churches. 62 As proposed in my prior article, churches should be excepted
Id. at 84-85.
55 Id. at 85.
56 Id. at 88; see, e.g., Regan v. Taxation with Representation of Wash., 461 U.S. 540,544
(1983) (discussing the availability of tax exemption as a social welfare organization); Branch
Ministries v. Rossotti, 211 F.3d 137, 143 (D.C. Cir. 2000) (discussing the Church's ability to
form a related organization under 501(c)(4)). Section 501(c)(4) grants tax-exempt status to
[c]ivic leagues or organizations not organized for profit but operated
exclusively for the promotion of social welfare, or local associations of
employees, the membership of which is limited to the employees of a
designated person or persons in a particular municipality, and the net
earnings of which are devoted exclusively to charitable, educational, or
recreational purposes.
I.R.C. § 501(c)(4)(A) (2000).
"7 Mirkay, Charities & Discrimination, supra note 5, at 88; see I.R.C. § 170(a)(1),
(c)(l)-(2) (2000).
51 Mirkay, Charities & Discrimination, supra note 5, at 88.
59 See HOPKINS, supra note 48, § 10.2(a) (reviewing various Supreme Court and state court
language grappling with defining religion).
60 JAMES J. FISHMAN & STEPHEN SCHWARZ, NONPROFIT ORGANIZATIONS: CASES AND
MATERIALS 444 (3d ed. 2006); see also HOPKINS, supra note 48, § 10.3 (stating the IRS has
resisted publishing criteria for what constitutes a church).
61 FISHMAN & SCHWARZ, supra note 60, at 445.
62 I.R.C. § 508(c)(1)(A) (2000); see also I.R.C. § 508(b) (exempting churches from notice
rules governing other exempt organizations); I.R.C. § 6033(a)(2)(A)(iii) (exempting religious
orders from filing certain annual returns); I.R.C. § 7611 (restricting auditing of churches);
[Vol. 17:715
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from the nondiscrimination requirement due to First Amendment concerns.63 This
raises the issue of how narrowly the federal income tax definition of a "church" should
be drawn, taking into consideration that schools, universities, and social service agen-
cies may presently be component parts of a church or qualify as "integrated auxilia-
ries" and, thus, treated as churches under the Code.64 Although my prior article briefly
addressed the difficulty of applying a nondiscrimination requirement to religious orga-
nizations, it acknowledged the necessity of additional and more thorough discussion
on the issue;6 thus, the focus of this Article.
Accordingly, this Article examines the propriety and constitutionality of subject-
ing religious organizations to a § 501(c)(3) nondiscrimination requirement and crafting
a more narrow church exception to that requirement. This Article ultimately proposes
modification of the current statutory and regulatory exemption scheme for religious
organizations to effect a more narrowly drawn federal income tax definition of a
church. Part I of this Article provides a statutory and regulatory framework for the
proposal. Part I1 briefly reviews other noteworthy proposals with respect to combating
discrimination, such as expansion of the public-policy doctrine and broader applica-
bility of civil rights laws, and concludes that both fail in the context of sexual orien-
tation and marital status discrimination. It further offers a potential solution in the
form of statutory and regulatory amendments that would narrow the eligibility of
integrated auxiliary status and, thus, limit the availability of church tax benefits to
affiliated organizations. Part 11 attempts to tackle the seemingly enormous, yet pre-
carious, constitutional issues inherent in the proposal; namely, First Amendment free
speech, establishment, and free exercise concerns.
I. THE EVOLVING TAXONOMY OF "RELIGIOUS" AND "CHURCH"
A. Overview of the Federal Income Tax Exemption66
In order to discuss the incongruity of deeming a discriminatory organization
"religious," it is necessary to understand the exemption statute and the regulatory
tests that must be satisfied before the IRS grants an exemption. Section 501(c)(3)
provides for the federal income tax exemption of nonprofit corporations and certain
other entities
infra notes 101-05 and accompanying text.
63 Mirkay, Charities & Discrimination, supra note 5, at 100. The article further proposed
extending the exception to religious orders and similar exclusively religious organizations
exempt under § 501(c)(3). Id. at 100 n.325.
64 Id. at 98-100.
65 Id. at 88 (discussing the difficulties of applying a nondiscrimination requirement to
religious organizations).
6 The discussion in this subpart is substantially similar to a corresponding discussion con-
tained in Mirkay, Charities & Discrimination, supra note 5, at 54-56.
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organized and operated exclusively for religious, charitable,
scientific .... or educational purposes, . . . no part of the net
earnings of which inures to the benefit of any private share-
holder or individual, no substantial part of the activities of which
is carrying on propaganda, or otherwise attempting, to influence
legislation.., and which does not participate in, or intervene in
... any political campaign on behalf of (or in opposition to) any
candidate for public office.67
The principal benefit of a § 501(c)(3) exemption is that the exempt organization is
entitled to receive charitable contributions that are tax-deductible to its donors under
§ 170(a)(1). 68 For the most part, only organizations exempt under § 501(c)(3) are eli-
gible for this valuable benefit.69 In addition, organizations exempt under § 501 (c)(3)
are also eligible to issue bonds, subject to certain limitations, the interest on which
is not included in the bondholder's income.7°
IRS regulations and rulings define the meaning of each of the eight specific
exempt purposes listed in the statute (for example, religious, charitable, 71 and edu-
cational). 72 Section 501(c)(3) establishes both an organizational test and an opera-
tional test for determining whether an organization fulfills its exempt purposes; 73 to
qualify for exemption, an organization must meet both tests.74 The organizational
67 I.R.C. § 501(c)(3) (2000). Specifically, § 501(a) provides that "[a]n organization
described in subsection (c) or (d)... shall be exempt from taxation under this subtitle ......
Id. § 501(a).
68 Id. § 170(a)(1) ("There shall be allowed as a deduction any charitable contribution...
payment of which is made within the taxable year."). Donors must primarily make contri-
butions to either governmental entities or charitable organizations under § 501 (c)(3). See id.
§ 170(c)(l)-(2).
69 Certain veterans' organizations, fraternal organizations, and cemetery organizations,
which are exempt from federal income tax under other subsections of § 501(c), are also entitled
to receive tax-deductible contributions. See id. § 170(c)(3)-(5).
70 See id. §§ 103(a), 141, 145-49.
7 See supra note 50; see also Mirkay, Charities & Discrimination, supra note 5 (discussing
the meaning of "charitable" under § 501 (c)(3) and the common practice of collectively referring
to the entities listed in the statute as "charitable"). In addition, the IRS has determined that other
qualifying purposes meet the overall public-benefit principle of § 501(c)(3) based on an ex-
pansive interpretation of "charitable." See Brennen, Tax Expenditures, supra note 41, at 178.
72 Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)-1(d) (as amended in 2008) (categorizing the exemptions as:
religious, charitable, scientific, testing for public safety, literary, educational, or prevention of
cruelty to children or animals). Section 501 (c)(3) lists as an eighth exempt purpose "to foster
national or international amateur sports competition," which is not addressed by any regulation.
I.R.C. § 501(c)(3) (2000).
71 I.R.C. § 501(c)(3).
74 Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)-1(a)(1) (as amended in 2008).
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test relates solely to the language used in the organization's governing documents.7"
An organization meets the requirements of the test if it was organized exclusively for
at least one tax-exempt, charitable purpose.76 This is possible only if the organizing
document (1) limits the organization's purpose to one or more exempt purposes, and
(2) does not expressly empower it to substantially engage in activities that do not fur-
ther any exempt purposes.77 The organizational test also imposes requirements on the
distribution of the organization's assets upon dissolution."
The purpose of the operational test is to ensure that an exempt organization's re-
sources and activities are devoted primarily to its exempt purposes. The regulations
break down the operational test into two components: (1) the primary-purpose-or-
activity test and (2) the private-inurement prohibition.79 Under the primary-purpose-
or-activity test, "[an organization will be regardedas operated exclusively for one
or more exempt purposes only if it engages primarily in activities which accomplish
one or more of such exempt purposes specified in section 501(c)(3)."8° An organi-
zation will not pass this test if "more than an insubstantial part of its activities is not
in furtherance of an exempt purpose."8'
Under the private-inurement prohibition, an organization will not satisfy the
operational test "if its net earnings inure in whole or in part to the benefit of private
shareholders or individuals." 2 The regulations define the term "private shareholder
or individual" as "persons having a personal and private interest in the activities of
the organization, 83 such as officers, directors, or other individuals in a position to
assert influence or control over the organization's operations and activities.84 The
prohibition is absolute-any amount of inurement is impermissible.85 Organizations
exempt under § 501 (c)(3) are also subject to other statutory and regulatory standards
with respect to their operations, including the private-benefit doctrine. 6
" See id. § 1.501(c)(3)-l(b)(1)(i).
76 See id. § 1.501(c)(3)-1(a)(1).
" Id. § 1.501(c)(3)-l(b)(1)(i).
78 See id. § 1.501 (c)(3)- I (b)(4). The IRS typically implements this regulation by requiring
an organization, either in its governing document or under relevant state law, to explicitly
dedicate its assets to one or more exempt purposes in the event of dissolution. Id.
" See id. § 1.501(c)(3)-1(c)(1) & (2).
'0 Id. § 1.501(c)(3)-1(c)(l).
81 Id.
81 Id. § 1.501(c)(3)-1(c)(2).
83 Id. § 1.501(a)-l(c); see also I.R.S. Gen. Couns. Mem. 39,862 (Nov. 22, 1991) ("The
proscription against inurement generally applies to... persons who, because of their particular
relationship with an organization, have an opportunity to control or influence its activities.").
84 See HOPKINS, supra note 48, § 20.3.
85 See Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)-1(c)(2) (as amended in 2008).
86 See id. § 1.501(c)(3)-l(d)(1)(ii). For further discussion of the private-benefit doctrine
and other operational restrictions, see Nicholas A. Mirkay, Relinquish Control! Why the IRS
Should Change Its Stance on Exempt Organizations in Ancillary Joint Ventures, 6 NEV. L.J.
21, 30-34, 62 (2005).
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As previously mentioned, the Supreme Court's Bob Jones University decision
imposes the additional, nonstatutory public-policy doctrine on an organization seeking
tax-exempt status under § 501(c)(3).87 By failing to articulate a clearly defined source
of "established public policy, '8 8 courts have left the doctrine open to the IRS's un-
fettered discretion, 9 potentially allowing discrimination to flourish in areas other than
race, civil disobedience, and illegality.
B. "Religious" Organization and "Church" under Federal Income Tax Law
1. Definition of "Religious" and "Church" 9
To allay any constitutional concerns, religious organizations are generally defined
broadly to include a variety of other organizations in addition to churches or traditional
houses of worship. 91 The IRS is acutely aware of the constitutional ramifications of
attempting to define "religion" or "religious" narrowly, and has advised its agents to
interpret the terms broadly to encompass "even those sects that do not believe in a
Supreme Being., 92 Accordingly, the IRS has subscribed to this general rule: "in the
absence of a clear showing that the beliefs or doctrines under consideration are not
sincerely held by those professing or claiming them as a religion, the Service cannot
question the 'religious' nature of those beliefs."93 The IRS concluded that this rule
comports with the Establishment Clause: "An attempt to define religion, even for pur-
poses of statutory construction, violates the 'establishment' clause since it necessarily
delineates and, therefore, limits what can and cannot be a religion."'94 In fact, the IRS
has typically denied religious organization exemptions only on other grounds, such
as the private-inurement prohibition 95 or the restrictions on lobbying and political
campaign activities under § 501(c)(3). 96
87 Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S. 574, 585 (1983).
18 Id. at 586.
89 See Brennen, Tax Expenditures, supra note 41, at 178 n.48.
9 Portions of the discussion in this subpart are substantially similar to a corresponding
discussion contained in Mirkay, Charities & Discrimination, supra note 5, at 95-99.
9' See supra notes 60-61 and accompanying text.
92 FISHMAN & SCHWARZ, supra note 60, at 445; see also I.R.S. Gen. Couns. Mem. 36,993
(Feb. 3, 1977) (finding that a witches' coven qualified as a church under § 501(c)(3)).
9' I.R.S. Gen. Couns. Mem. 36,993 (Feb. 3, 1977); see also Holy Spirit Ass'n for the
Unification of World Christianity v. Tax Comm'n, 435 N.E.2d 662,668 (N.Y. 1982) ("It is
for religious bodies themselves, rather than the courts or administrative agencies, to define,
by their teachings and activities, what their religion is. The courts are obliged to accept such
characterization... unless it is found to be insincere or [a] sham.").
9 I.R.S. Gen. Couns. Mem. 36,993 (Feb. 3, 1977).
9 See supra notes 82-86 and accompanying text.
96 See, e.g., Branch Ministries v. Rossotti, 211 F.3d 137 (D.C. Cir. 2000) (addressing a
church's political campaign prohibition violation); Christian Echoes Nat'l Ministry, Inc. v.
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Even though it cannot question or regulate religious belief and opinions, Congress
can regulate religious action and practices.97 In Reynolds v. United States, the Supreme
Court upheld a federal law criminalizing the practice of polygamy.98 In holding that
citizens were not excepted from the statute because of their religious beliefs, the Court
explained that a law may impede religious practices, but not religious beliefs or opin-
ions.99 In a subsequent case involving a state statute that regulated solicitation by
charitable organizations, the Court elaborated on Reynolds by stating that "the [First]
Amendment embraces two concepts-freedom to believe and freedom to act. The
first is absolute but, in the nature of things, the second cannot be. Conduct remains
subject to regulation for the protection of society.""''
Although the same congressional and IRS trepidation with respect to religious
belief is present in attempting to define a "church,"' 0 ' some designation is necessary
because of the unique treatment and protection that churches receive under the
Code." As one court astutely observed, "To exempt churches, one must know what
a church is."' 3 In making these designations, the IRS follows a fifteen-item check-
list ° -including a distinct legal existence, a recognized creed and form of worship,
United States, 470 F.2d 849 (10th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 864 (1973) (involving the
revocation of an organization's exempt status because it failed to meet the operational test and
violated lobbying and political campaign restrictions); Unitary Mission Church of Long Island
v. Comm'r, 74 T.C. 507 (1980), affid, 647 F.2d 163 (2d Cir. 1981) (upholding the denial of a
church's exemption because of the private benefit and inurement to the organization's control-
ling members); see also United States v. Kuch, 288 F. Supp. 439,444 (D.D.C. 1968) (determin-
ing that the organization at issue was not "religious" because it was clearly motivated by the
"desire to use drugs and to enjoy drugs for their own sake").
97 FISHMAN & SCHWARZ, supra note 60, at 453.
98 98 U.S. 145 (1878).
99 Id. at 166.
"o Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296,303--04 (1940). At issue in the case was a state
statute that prohibited the solicitation of contributions by religious, charitable, or philanthropic
causes without obtaining official approval. Id. at 301-02. The Court ultimately concluded that
such approval constituted an invalid prior constraint on the free exercise of religion. Id. at 307.
101 HoPKINs, supra note 48, § 10.3.
'02 See infra notes 111-16 and accompanying text.
103 De LaSalle Inst. v. United States, 195 F. Supp. 891,903 (N.D. Cal. 1961). The court's
full observation states that: "Congress must either define 'church' or leave the definition to
the common meaning and usage of the word; otherwise, Congress would be unable to exempt
churches." Id.
104 ROBERT LOUTHIAN & THOMAS MILLER, I.R.S., DEFINING "CHURCH"--THE CONCEPT
OF A CONGREGATION 2 (1993), http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-tege/eotopica94.pdf. The fifteen
points are as follows:
(a) a distinct legal existence, (b) a recognized creed and form of worship,
(c) a definite and distinct ecclesiastical government, (d) a formal code of
doctrine and discipline, (e) a distinct religious history, (f) a membership
not associated with any other church or denomination, (g) an organization
of ordained ministers, (h) ordained ministers selected after completing
20091
WILLIAM & MARY BILL OF RIGHTS JOURNAL
a formal code of doctrine and discipline, a distinct religious history, and the selection
of ordained ministers after prescribed studies.'05 Although the IRS has cautioned that
these criteria are not exclusive and that it ultimately uses a facts-and-circumstances
determination, °6 the criterion that courts most consistently rely on in determining the
existence of a church is the presence or absence of an established and regular con-
gregation. "° Specifically, the focus is on a coherent and dynamic membership with
shared religious purposes and beliefs.'0 8 The size of the congregation is not determi-
native.'(" Because charitable organizations must primarily confer public benefit, the
congregational or associational facet of a church comports with that requirement."10
Although nearly all religious organizations are eligible for a tax exemption under
§ 501 (c)(3), only "churches, their integrated auxiliaries, and conventions or associa-
tions of churches" are presumed not to be private foundations, 11' and thus, excepted
from the notice requirements of § 508.112 That is, a church does not need to file an
application for the IRS to recognize it as exempt under § 501(c)(3). 113 Churches are
also relieved of filing annual information returns with the IRS. 114 In addition, the
Code confers upon churches special procedural safeguards with respect to IRS
prescribed studies, (I) a literature of its own, (j) established places of wor-
ship, (k) regular congregations, (1) regular religious services, (in) Sunday
schools for religious instruction of the young, (n) schools for the prepa-
ration of its ministers, and (o) any other facts and circumstances that may
bear upon the organization's claim for church status.
Id. In instructing that the criteria "are not exclusive and are not to be mechanically applied,"
the IRS Chief Counsel recommended the addition of the fifteenth criterion. See I.R.S. Gen.
Couns. Mem. 38,982 (May 3, 1983). Federal courts adopted the original fourteen-point test
in Am. Guidance Found., Inc. v. United States, 490 F. Supp. 304, 306 n.2 (D.D.C. 1980) (not
including the residual, "facts and circumstances" factor).
'0" LOUTHIAN & MILLER, supra note 104.
106 Id.
"o Id. at 3("At a minimum, a church includes a body of believers or communicants that
assembles regularly in order to worship." (quotingAm. Guidance Found., 490 F. Supp. at 306)).
108 LOAUTHIAN & MILLER, supra note 104, at 8.
'09 See id.
0 Wendy Gerzog Shaller, Churches and Their Enviable Tax Status, 51 U. Prrr. L. REV.
345, 351, 353 n.52; see also Charles M. Whelan, "Church" in the Internal Revenue Code:
The Definitional Problems, 45 FORDHAM L. REv. 885, 926 (1977) (discussing the centrality
of the congregational model to the I.R.S.'s conception of a "church").
"l I.R.C. § 508(b), (c)(1)(A) (2000). See infra note 148 for an explanation of private
foundation versus public charity status under § 509.
112 See id. § 508(c)(1).
13 See id. § 508(c)(1)(A); Treas. Reg. § 1.508-1(a)(3)(i)(a) (as amended in 1995).
"4 See I.R.C. § 6033(a)(2)(A)(I) (2000). However, churches are required to file a Form
990-T, Exempt Organization Business Income Tax Return, reporting any income that is subject
to the unrelated business income tax imposed by § 511 (a). See also Treas. Reg. § 1.6012-2(e)
(as amended in 2007).
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examinations or audits.1 5 Moreover, among other exemptions, churches are exempted
from certain rules governing qualified retirement plans, and social security, self-
employment, and withholding taxes." 6
As illustrated below, churches have varying and multifaceted structures, and their
activities typically comprise more than just providing religious services and worship
to their congregants. Many churches also operate schools, seminaries, or social-service
agencies. The manner in which the church operates these other activities-within
or without a separate legal entity-raises potential tax exemption issues." 7 Until a
church places an activity in a separate legal entity, the IRS generally considers it to be
a part of the church and therefore covered by the church's exemption.18 Once the
church forms a new legal entity to conduct an activity, the entity must obtain its own
tax-exempt status. 19 Due to the entity's relationship to the church, the Code typi-
cally classifies it as an "integrated auxiliary," which accords the entity church-like
treatment. 2° The statutory requirements and significance of being categorized as an
integrated auxiliary are discussed in greater detail in the following subparts.
2. Historical Overview of the Distinction
The history of the Code's distinction between churches and religious organiza-
tions is particularly relevant to this Article. Primarily, it exposes Congress's choice
to treat churches differently from other religious organizations, and how that special
treatment was extended to integrated auxiliaries or affiliates of churches, such as
educational institutions. As this discussion reveals, this extension of church-like
treatment directly impacts the applicability of a nondiscrimination requirement to
these church affiliates.
The tax exemption of religious organizations-specifically, churches-is deep-
rooted in American history.' 2' Beginning in 1798, Congress recognized the propriety
"' See I.R.C. § 7611 (2000). Section 761 1(h)(1) defines church as "any organization claim-
ing to be a church" and "any convention or association of churches." Id.
116 NICHOLAS P. CAFARDI & JACLYN FABEAN CHERRY, UNDERSTANDING NONPROFIT AND
TAXEXEMPTORGANZATIONS § 8.03[C] (2006) (citing I.R.C. §§ 410(c)(1)(B), 411 (e)(1)(B),
412(h)(4), 414(e), 1402(e), 3121(b)(8), 3401(a)(9)); see also Whelan, supra note 110, at
887-89 & nn. 11-25 (listing fifteen basic religious distinctions recognized by the Internal
Revenue Code).
"7 CAFARDI & CHERRY, supra note 116, § 8.06.
118 Id.
119 Id.
120 Id.
121 Walz v. Tax Comm'n of N.Y., 397 U.S. 664, 676-77 (1970); see JOHN D. COLOMBO
& MARK A. HALL, THE CHARITABLE TAX EXEMPTION 226 (1995) ("[T]he core rationale for
religious exemption has seldom been questioned."); Edward McGlynn Gaffney, Jr., Exemption
of Religious Organizations from Federal Taxation, in RELIGIOUS ORGANIZATIONS IN THE
UNITED STATES 409,411 (James A. Serritella et al. eds., 2006) [hereinafter Gaffney, Federal
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of, and adopted for federal tax purposes, the states' exemptions of churches from real
estate tax and other direct taxes. 22 Since the Sixteenth Amendment's enactment, reli-
gious organizations have been continuously exempted from federal income tax. 23
In 1917, Congress further extended religious organizations' federal tax benefits by
enacting a deduction for contributions made to "corporations or associations orga-
nized and operated exclusively for religious, charitable, scientific, or educational
purposes."' 24 Although churches are considered to be religious organizations, the
opposite is not generally correct.
25
The statutory distinction between churches and religious organizations primarily
began with the enactment of the unrelated business income tax in 1950.126 By specif-
ically excepting "a church, a convention or association of churches" from the new
tax,127 Congress acknowledged the difference between churches (religious organiza-
tions that maintain "exclusively religious activities") and church-affiliated entities
("religious organizations that carry on charitable, literary, or educational activities"). 21
As a consequence, church-related charitable and educational entities, such as colleges
and universities, social service agencies, and hospitals, appeared to be subject to the
new tax. 29 Because of the varying and multifaceted structure of American churches,
however, the IRS experienced great difficulty in implementing this distinction. 3'
As explained by one legal scholar, American churches are generally either "congre-
gational" or "hierarchical" in their configuration:
In the congregational churches, the faith and internal reli-
gious law of the denominations make each local congregation
Taxation] ("The U.S. federal government and all fifty states maintain a system of general ex-
emption of religion from the payment of most forms of taxation. This widespread American
practice is not a recent invention; on the contrary, it is rooted deeply in the principle of religious
freedom, a value at the very core of the American constitutional order.").
122 Walz, 397 U.S. at 677-78 & n.5; see also Daniel M. Andersen, Political Silence at
Church: The Empty Threat of Removing Tax-Exempt Status for Insubstantial Attempts to
Influence Legislation, 2006 BYU L. REV. 115, 122 ("[Bly traditional default, churches are
generally not part of the federal tax base.").
121 Walz, 397 U.S. at 676 n.4.
124 War Revenue Act of 1917, ch. 63, § 1201(2), 40 Stat. 300, 330; see also Aprill, supra
note 6, at 848.
125 Shaller, supra note 110, at 350.
126 Whelan, supra note 110, at 901.
12' Revenue Act of 1950, ch. 994, § 421(b)(1), 64 Stat. 948, 948; see also Whelan, supra
note 110, at 902. The exception was eliminated by the Tax Reform Act of 1969, Pub. L. No.
91-172, 83 Stat. 536 (codified at I.R.C. § 511).
128 Reka Potgieter Hoff, The Financial Accountability of Churches for Federal Income Tax
Purposes: Establishment or Free Exercise?, 11 VA. TAX REv. 71, 82 (1991).
129 Whelan, supra note 110, at 902-03.
130 Id. at 903.
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autonomous. The coordination of the various congregations'
activities is a matter of voluntary agreement or "covenant." Each
local congregation is usually a separate civil law corporation or
trust.... Thus there is no Baptist Church; there are only Baptist
churches and Baptist conventions or associations of churches....
In the hierarchical churches, such as the Roman Catholic, Pres-
byterian, Eastern Orthodox, and Mormon denominations, the
faith and internal religious law create a single church authority
with jurisdiction over all the members and branches of the church.
Local congregations are divisions, not autonomous units. Thus
it is entirely proper to speak of the "Roman Catholic Church" or
the "Mormon Church." 1
31
Regardless of their structure, churches uniformly utilize numerous corporations
and trusts to accomplish their various missions. 32 For instance, the Roman Catholic
Church in the United States does not technically exist as a single entity but rather as
"a conglomeration.., of distinct taxable entities united in religious faith, worship
and authority but not in civil law identity or control.' 133 Accordingly, in implementing
this exception with respect to various American churches, the IRS had to determine
which entities comprised the "church" and which merely constituted church-related
entities not covered by the statutory exception."
Although the Tax Reform Act of 1969 (1969 Act) eliminated the church exception
to the unrelated business income tax, 35 the distinction between churches and religious
organizations was incorporated into newly enacted code provisions. The 1969 Act
added the notice requirement of § 508 to the Code, requiring newly created nonprofit
131 Id. at 903-04; see Hoff, supra note 128, at 83 (noting that under a congregational struc-
ture, church property is owned in trust by a group of lay trustees, whereas in a hierarchical
structure, church property is held by a bishop "as a corporation sole").
132 Whelan, supra note 110, at 904.
133 Id. at 905. Although the IRS issues a "group ruling" to the United States Catholic
Conference, which effectively permits the IRS to deal with the Roman Catholic church as
a single "unit," the ruling does acknowledge that the church is comprised of many separate
and distinct entities as listed and updated annually in the Official Catholic Directory. Id. at
905 n.86.
"3 Id. at 905. Whelan further identified the classification problem raised with respect to
"religious orders" within the Roman Catholic Church. Id.; see, e.g., De La Salle Inst. v. United
States, 195 F. Supp. 891 (N.D. Cal. 1961). The IRS finally addressed the issue by regulation.
See Treas. Reg. § 1.511-2(a)(3), T.D. 6301, 195 8-2 C.B. 222-23 (including a religious order
within the meaning of "church" if the order is (i) an integral part of the church, and (ii) engaged
in implementing the church's functions, regardless of whether it is separately incorporated).
"3' Tax Reform Act of 1969, Pub. L. No. 91-172, § 121, 83 Stat. 487, 536-37 (codified
as amended at 26 U.S.C. §§ 501-526). Under the Act, all § 501(a) tax-exempt organizations
are subject to the unrelated business income tax except for federal instrumentalities. Id.
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organizations to file an application with the IRS to be recognized as exempt from fed-
eral income tax under § 501(c)(3).'36 However, "churches, their integrated auxiliaries,
and conventions or associations of churches" were specifically exempted from this
new notice requirement. 137 As discussed below, Congress used the same language
for purposes of exemption from the § 6033 annual return requirement. 3 ' The new
"integrated auxiliaries" language resulted from compromise negotiations between the
Senate Finance Committee, the Joint Committee on Taxation, and American churches'
representatives concerned about the restrictive and administratively difficult language
utilized to except churches from the unrelated business income tax. 139 Although the
Senate Finance Committee's report did not define the new term, it did provide some
examples of integrated auxiliaries, including "mission societies and the church's
religious schools, youth groups, and men's and women's organizations."'" The 1969
Act also broadened the exemption from the annual return requirement to include the
"exclusively religious activities of any religious order."' 4'
Prior to its amendment in the 1969 Act, § 6033 exempted all religious organiza-
tions from the requirement to file annual information returns with the IRS.142 The
1969 Act, however, limited this religious exception to just "churches, their integrated
auxiliaries, and conventions or associations of churches.' 43 In proposed regulations
136 I.R.C. § 508(a) (2000).
'3 Tax Reform Act of 1969, Pub. L. No. 91-172, § 101, 83 Stat. 487, 494-96 (codified
at I.R.C. § 508(c)(1)(A) (2000)).
138 See infra note 142 and accompanying text.
139 Whelan, supra note 110, at 914-15.
140 S. REP. No. 91-552, at 52 (1969). The House conference committee report essentially
adopted the language of this Senate report: "The integrated auxiliary organizations to which
this applies include the church's religious school, youth group, and men's and women's clubs."
H.R. REP. No. 91-782, at 286 (1969); see also Whelan, supra note 110, at 915-16.
"' I.R.C. § 6033(a)(2)(A)(iii) (2000). The House conference committee report explains
that the term "exclusively religious activities" does not include "any educational, charitable,
or other exempt activities which would serve as a basis of exemption under section 501(c)(3)
if an organization which is not a religious organization is required to report with respect to
such activities." H.R. REP. No. 91-782, at 286 (1969); see also Whelan, supra note 110, at 916.
There is no documented IRS effort requiring religious orders to report on non-"exclusively
religious" activities. Id.
142 Specifically, § 6033 then provided that
[n]o such annual return need be filed under this subsection by any orga-
nization exempt from taxation under the provisions of section 501 (a)-(1)
which is a religious organization described in section 501(c)(3); or...
(4) which is an organization described in section 501(c)(3), if such orga-
nization is operated, supervised, or controlled by or in connection with
a religious organization described in paragraph (1).
I.R.C. § 6033(a) (1954).
'43 See Tax Reform Act of 1969, Pub. L. No. 91-172, § 101, 83 Stat. 487,519-23; I.R.C.
§ 6033(a)(1) (1954). Paragraph (2) of § 6033(a) was redesignated as paragraph (3) by the Tax
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released in 1976, the Treasury Department defined "integrated auxiliary" as a
§ 501(c)(3) organization whose primary purpose is "to carry out the tenets, func-
tions, and principles of faith of the church with which it is affiliated" and whose
operations "directly promote religious activity among the members of the church."
'1
"
The proposed regulation provided examples similar to those espoused in the Senate
Finance Committee report, but additionally stated that "[s]chools of a general aca-
demic or vocational nature are not considered to be integrated auxiliaries, even though
they have a religious environment or promote the church's teaching.' 45 Consistent
with this statement, the proposed regulations used a parochial elementary school as
an example of an organization that was not an integrated auxiliary. The regulation
explained that the school's primary purpose was to fulfill educational needs, even
though it included religious services and subjects in its academic programs. Thus, the
school failed the "purpose and function" test of the regulation.'16 American churches
of all faiths and denominations almost unanimously rejected this test, claiming that
it represented IRS intrusion into their religious activities. 47
In the Tax Reform Act of 1976, Congress enacted § 501(h), which created an
expenditure-based safe harbor for certain publicly funded charitable organiza-
tions-"public charities""a-with respect to their lobbying activities. 149 Pursuant
to § 501(h)(5), churches, their integrated auxiliaries, and a convention or association
of churches are ineligible to make this election. 150 Because the IRS had recently
Increase Prevention and Reconciliation Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-222, 120 Stat. 345
(codified at I.R.C. § 6033(a)(3)(A)(i) (2006)).
" Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.6033-2(g)(5)(i), 41 Fed. Reg. 6073 (Feb. 11, 1976).
145 Id.
146 Id. § 1.6033-2(g)(5), example (3); see also Whelan, supra note 110, at 894-95. Because
example (3) in the proposed regulations specifically provided that the school had a separate
legal identity from the church, it raised the issue of whether an organization must be legally
separate from the church (i.e., a corporation, trust, or other entity) in order to qualify as an
integrated auxiliary. The question was, and continues to be, relevant in that many churches
directly own and operate schools, hospitals, and other social service agencies without separate
legal entities for such operations. See id. at 894 n.56.
147 See Whelan, supra note 110, at 895; see also Hoff, supra note 128, at 89 n.92.
148 An organization that meets the requirements of § 501(c)(3) is classified as either a
"public charity" or a "private foundation." I.R.C. § 509(a)(l)-(3) (2000). A "public charity"
typically receives its income from a broader segment of the general public in the form of gifts,
contributions, or receipts from the performance of services, whereas a "private foundation"
typically receives contributions from only a few individuals or entities. FISHMAN & SCHWAR7_
supra note 60, at 751. Furthermore, private foundations are subject to additional excise taxes.
See I.R.C. §§ 4940-4945 (2000).
14' Tax Reform Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-455, 90 Stat. 1520, 1720 (codified as amended
in scattered sections of 26 U.S.C.).
"' See Tax Reform Act of 1969, Pub. L. No. 91-172, § 101, 83 Stat. 487,519-23; I.R.C.
§ 501(h)(5) (2000). Section 501(h)(5) also excludes members of an "affiliated group of orga-
nizations" if one of the members is a church, an integrated auxiliary thereof, or a convention
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released its proposed regulations on "integrated auxiliaries" under § 6033, Congress
used the enactment of § 501 (h) and its use of that language as an opportune time to
comment on the regulations' interpretation of the statutory term.'5 ' Specifically, the
House Ways and Means Committee inserted the following comment into its report
accompanying the § 501(h) legislation:
Because proposed regulations have recently been published
regarding the meaning of the term "integrated auxiliary" and
because that term is used in this bill, your committee wishes to
make it clear-in agreement with the conclusions of the proposed
regulations-that theological seminaries, religious youth organi-
zations, and men's fellowship associations which are associated
with churches would generally constitute integrated auxiliaries.
Your committee also intends (in agreement with the conclusions
in the proposed regulations) that hospitals, elementary grade
schools, orphanages, and old-age homes are organizations which
frequently are established without regard to church relationships
and are to be treated for these purposes the same as corresponding
secular charitable, etc., organizations[;] that is, such entities are
not to be regarded as "integrated auxiliaries."' 52
The Senate Finance Committee report did not include this language, or any other lan-
guage, explaining the meaning of "integrated auxiliaries."'53 The House conference
committee report followed the Senate report, explicitly adopting a "no position" stand-
point with respect to the above-quoted House report language.154 Thus, as one legal
scholar noted, the controversy over integrated auxiliaries ended without a victor-the
churches failed to convince the conference committee to condemn the proposed reg-
ulations under § 6033, and the IRS failed to obtain legislative history favoring its
restrictive regulatory definition.155
In 1977, the IRS issued final regulations under § 6033 that attempted to resolve
some of the controversies surrounding the proposed regulations. 156 First, to be an in-
tegrated auxiliary of a church, the final regulations required that a church-affiliated
organization must be a separate legal entity that is tax-exempt under § 501(c)(3).157
or association of churches. Id.; see also I.R.C. § 4911(0(2) (2000) for a definition of "affiliated
group[s] of organizations."
'5' Whelan, supra note 110, at 920.
152 H.R. REP. No. 94-1210, at 15-16 (1976); see also Whelan, supra note 110, at 920.
"I S. REP. No. 94-938, pt. 2, at 79 (1976); see also Whelan, supra note 110, at 921.
'- H.R. REP. No. 94-1515, at 533-34 (1976); see also Whelan, supra note 110, at 921.
115 Whelan, supra note 110, at 921.
156 Treas. Reg. § 1.6033-2(g) (1977).
157 Id. § 1.6033-2(g)(5)(i)(a); see id. at example (6).
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Second, the final regulations disposed of the "purpose and function" test in favor of
a new "principal activity" test: the organization's principal activity must be "exclu-
sively religious."' 58 An "exclusively religious" activity was one that would qualify
for § 501(c)(3) tax-exempt status as a religious organization if it applied for its own
exemption. 59 Accordingly, a church-affiliated elementary school was not accorded
an integrated auxiliary exemption under the regulations because its principal activity
was educational rather than religious. 16° Notwithstanding this distinction, the final
regulations explicitly excepted a church-affiliated elementary or secondary school
from filing an annual return on another basis-the Treasury Secretary's statutorily
granted discretionary power. 61
American churches objected to the "exclusively religious" standard in the regu-
lations, resulting in litigation.'62 While that litigation was pending, Congress enacted
§ 3121(w) that set forth a financial support requirement for church-affiliated organiza-
tions desiring to elect out of social security coverage. 63 This legislative development
prompted the IRS to issue Revenue Procedure 86-23, which abandoned the "exclusively
religious" activity test in exchange for a more neutrally applied "internal support
test."'164 This test is satisfied if the affiliated organization either (I) does not offer
158 Id. § 1.6033-2(g)(5)(i)(c).
9 See T.D. 7454, 1977-1 C.B. 367 (Preamble); see also Treas. Reg. § 1.6033-2(g)(5)(ii)
(1977) ("An organization's principal activity will not be considered to be exclusively religious
if that activity is educational, literary, charitable, or of another nature (other than religious) that
would serve as a basis for exemption under section 501(c)(3).").
'60 Treas. Reg. § 1.6033-2(g)(5)(iv), example (2) (1977).
161 See I.R.C. § 6033(a)(2)(B) (1977); Treas. Reg. § 1.6033-2(g)(1)(vii) (1977); see also
42 Fed. Reg. 768 (Preamble). Whelan notes that the Secretary of the Treasury likely exer-
cised his discretionary power to try to "deflect a very powerful argument against the validity
of the new regulations with respect to parochial schools" because of recent Supreme Court
decisions characterizing such schools as "substantially religious and closely identified" with
the churches' mission. Whelan, supra note 110, at 898 n.63. Whelan further comments that
"[g]iven these decisions, it is unlikely that federal courts would agree with Treasury that these
schools are not component 'parts' of the churches that operate them, even when they are sepa-
rately incorporated." Id. (citing Levitt v. Comm. for Pub. Educ. & Religious Liberty, 413 U.S.
472 (1973); Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971)).
162 Hoff, supra note 128, at 92; see also Lutheran Soc. Serv. of Minn. v. United States, 583
F. Supp. 1298 (D. Minn. 1984), rev'd, 758 F.2d 1283, 1288-91 (8th Cir. 1985) (invalidating
the portion of the regulation requiring an organization's "principal activity" to be "exclusively
religious" in order to qualify as an integrated auxiliary as an impermissible interpretation of
§ 6033); Tenn. Baptist Children's Homes, Inc. v. United States, 604 F. Supp. 210,213 (M.D.
Tenn. 1984), affid, 790 F.2d 534 (6th Cir. 1986) (upholding the validity of the regulations, but
only upon concluding that the organization was "exclusively religious," thereby qualifying
as an integrated auxiliary).
163 Tax Reform Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-369, § 2603, 98 Stat. 494, 1128 (1994)
(codified at I.R.C. § 3121(w)(3)(B) (2000)); see also Hoff, supra note 128, at 92.
'64 Rev. Proc. 86-23, 1986-1 C.B. 564.
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"admissions, goods, services, or facilities for sale, other than on an incidental basis,
to the general public"; 165 or (ii) offers admissions, goods or services for sale, other
than on an incidental basis, to the general public and does not normally receive more
than fifty percent of its support from a "combination of governmental sources; public
solicitation of contributions," and receipts other than those from an unrelated trade
or business."s If organizations receive a majority of their support from public and
government sources rather than from church sources, the IRS reasoned that congres-
sional intent would compel such organizations to file annual returns, thus providing
opportunity for public inspection. 167 The other notion underlying this support test
is that the organization's "religious activity" is attenuated if a majority of its support
does not come from religious sources, thereby transforming the organization into a
"secular counterpart."'168 This financial standard was subsequently imported into the
final regulations under § 6033 addressing integrated auxiliaries. 169
3. Current Treatment of Integrated Auxiliaries
In late 1995, the IRS issued final regulations under § 6033 defining an "integrated
auxiliary."'"7 These regulations incorporate the internal support test of Revenue
Procedure 86-23'' and further require that the organization be a separate entity that is
(1) a "charitable" organization described in § 501 (c)(3) (for example, a school, mission
society, or youth group); (2) a public charity (as opposed to a private foundation); 172
165 There's an exception for when the goods, services, or facilities are sold for a nominal
charge or for substantially less than cost. Id.
166 id.
167 T.D. 8640, 1996-1 C.B. 289, 290.
16' George J. Blaine, The Unfortunate Church-State Dispute Over the I.R. C. Section 6033
"Exclusively Religious" Activity Test, 23 NEw ENG. L. REv. 1,41 (1988) ("Too much outside
secular support weakens the controlling church's influence on the organization, makes the
organization responsive to secular forces, and presumably dilutes its religious content. In
other words, the lack of sufficient in-house church support renders the organization a secular
counterpart."); see also Hoff, supra note 128, at 92.
69 See infra note 171 and accompanying text.
170 T.D. 8640, 1996-1 C.B. 289.
171 Under current regulations, an organization is "internally supported" unless it both:
(i) Offers admissions, goods, services or facilities for sale, other than
on an incidental basis, to the general public (except goods, services, or
facilities sold at a nominal charge or for an insubstantial portion of the
cost); and; (ii) Normally receives more than 50 percent of its support
from a combination of governmental sources, public solicitation of con-
tributions, and receipts from the sale of admissions, goods, performance
of services, or furnishing of facilities in activities that are not unrelated
trades or businesses.
Treas. Reg. § 1.6033-2(h)(4) (as amended in 1995).
172 See supra note 148.
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and (3) "[a]ffiliated with a church or a convention or association of churches."' 73 An
organization meets the "affiliated" requirement if it is covered by a group exemption
letter issued to a church; 174 is operated, supervised, or controlled by that church; or
if pertinent facts and circumstances establish such an affiliation. 75 The regulations
provide a nonexclusive list of factors to determine affiliation, including that (I) the
organization's charter or bylaws reveal that it shares common religious doctrines or
practices with a church or convention of churches, (ii) such church has the power to
appoint, control, or remove at least one of the organization's officers or directors,
(iii) the organization's name indicates an institutional relationship, (iv) the organiza-
tion submits financial and operational reports at least annually to the church, (v) the
church affirms its relationship with the organization, and (vi) upon dissolution, the
organization's assets are to be distributed to the church.
76
As set forth in the 1977 regulations, current regulations similarly provide that
men's and women's organizations, seminaries, mission societies, and youth groups
need not meet the internal support test to qualify as integrated auxiliaries, provided
that all of the other components are satisfied. 7 7 Similarly, elementary and secondary
schools need not satisfy the integrated auxiliary rules to be exempt from filing annual
returns provided they are considered "affiliated" with a church under those rules or
are operated by a religious order.178 Accordingly, the clear import from the various
interpretative regulations as well as the legislative history of the different acts affecting
and changing § 6033 is simplistic yet pertinent: an organization must have some sort
of "substantial connection" with a particular church as a condition of being considered
an "integrated" auxiliary.1
79
11. PROPOSALS TO COMBAT DISCRIMINATION BY RELIGIOUS ORGANIZATIONS
A. Overview of Alternative Proposals
As previously explained, the only potential restraint on discrimination by religious
organizations exists in the public-policy doctrine enunciated by the United States
7 Treas. Reg. § 1.6033-2(h)(1)(ii) (as amended in 1995).
A group-exemption letter--or "group ruling"--requires the church's central organization
to report the entities and affiliates covered by its exemption annually to the IRS and to certify
that each meets the requirements for exemption under § 501 (c)(3). See CAFARDI & CHERRY,
supra note 116, § 8.05.
17' Treas. Reg. § 1.6033-2(h)(2) (as amended in 1995).
176 Id. § 1.6033-2(h)(3); see also HOPKINS, supra note 48, § 10.5.
177 Treas. Reg. § 1.6033-2(h)(5) (1977).
178 Treas. Reg. § 1.6033-2(g)(1)(vii) (as amended in 1995). Neither the Code nor the reg-
ulations define "religious order." Rather, under Revenue Procedure 91-20, an organization
qualifies as a religious order based on certain attributes extracted from prior case law. Rev.
Proc. 91-20, 199 1-1 C.B. 524-25; see also HOPKINS, supra note 48, § 10.6.
"' Whelan, supra note 110, at 915 n.125.
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Supreme Court in Bob Jones University v. United States.'go However, to date, only
organizations that participated in racial discrimination, advocated civil disobedience,
or were involved in an illegal activity have lost their tax-exempt status pursuant to
the public-policy doctrine.'' Despite its clear importance in combating racial dis-
crimination in education, the doctrine's main failure is its lack of a clearly-defined
source of "established public policy.' 8 2 Namely, which sources of law or current
policy should the IRS consult to determine that an established national policy exists?8 3
Furthermore, of particular relevance, does discrimination on the basis of sexual
orientation or marital status, as evidenced by examples herein, violate an established
public policy? Legal scholars differ in their conclusions."u Critics also routinely
comment that the public policy doctrine places too much discretion in a regulatory
agency,"' resulting in an evidentiary burden borne by the IRS to determine and prove
that an organization's activities or policies violate a fundamental public policy. 86
Finally, some doubt exists as to the doctrine's applicability to churches or "other
purely religious institutions," to which the Supreme Court alluded in its decision. 7
As addressed in my prior article, Professor David Brennen proposes expanding
the applicability of civil rights laws to combat discrimination by charitable organiza-
tions, including religious organizations.188 Although this expansion approach pos-
sesses significant potential, it nevertheless fails to address the kinds of discrimination
illustrated in this Article. 8 9 Current civil rights laws have limited application in that
they only protect against discrimination based on race, color, national or ethnic origin,
religion, sex, age, and disability.' 9° These laws do not prohibit discrimination on the
bases of sexual orientation or marital status 19 1-both of which appear to be common
forms of discrimination currently engaged in by religious organizations. 92 Although
180 461 U.S. 574,586 (1983) (finding "unmistakable evidence" that the intent of § 501(c)(3)
requires the institution to serve a "public purpose and not be contrary to established public
policy").
' Brennen, Racial Discrimination, supra note 45, at 391.
182 Mirkay, Charities & Discrimination, supra note 5, at 51, 67; see also Brennen, Racial
Discrimination, supra note 45, at 403-04, 407, 436-39.
183 Mirkay, Charities and Discrimination, supra note 5, at 67.
"S See supra note 48 and accompanying text; see also Martha Minow, Should Religious
Groups Be Exempt from Civil Rights Laws?, 48 B.C. L. REv. 781, 821 (2007) ("Neither na-
tional consensus nor federal power squarely guards against sexual orientation discrimination.").
185 See supra note 49 and accompanying text.
186 Mirkay, Charities & Discrimination, supra note 5, at 67; see also Hatfield, supra note
48, at 16.
187 See infra notes 289-90 and accompanying text.
188 See Brennen, Tax Expenditures, supra note 41, at 169.
i89 See supra notes 24-43 and accompanying text.
'90 See Brennen, Tax Expenditures, supra note 41, at 171-82; see also Minow, supra note
184.
'9' Mirkay, Charities & Discrimination, supra note 5, at 82 nn.220-21.
'99 See supra notes 24-43 and accompanying text; see also Mirkay, Charities &
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Brennen acknowledged that discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation is "harm-
ful discriminatory behavior,"1 9 his expansion proposal fails to address such behavior
adequately. The application of civil rights laws to address discrimination is further
muddied by the fact that religious organizations are entitled to discriminate on the
basis of religion in their employment decisions without violating Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964.94 Courts have routinely aligned with religious organizations on
claims of sexual orientation discrimination in employment. 95 Accordingly, Congress
would need to amend current civil rights laws to expressly prohibit discrimination on
the basis of sexual orientation and marital status to truly abolish the discriminatory
activities and policies exhibited herein. The congressional intent necessary to prohibit
these kinds of discrimination by all private actors, including charitable and religious
organizations, is dubious at best. Therefore, a more tailored legislative response
targeting charitable and religious organizations may prove to be more effective.
B. Proposal-Narrowing Eligibility for Integrated Auxiliary Status to More
Broadly Apply a Statutory Nondiscrimination Requirement
As previously mentioned, imposing a broad-based nondiscrimination requirement
on religious organizations is difficult because of the constitutional concern of drawing
too narrow a definition of "religious" or "church." '196 As proposed in my prior article,
churches should likely be exempt from a statutory nondiscrimination requirement
due to constitutional concerns, primarily those originating from the First Amendment's
religion clauses. 197 While there is some constitutionally based analysis ostensibly
supporting the imposition of a nondiscrimination requirement on churches,9' there
are other Free Exercise and Establishment Clause concerns, the answers to which are
Discrimination, supra note 5, at 48-50. Unless reported in the press or discussed in a court
decision, the type and frequency of alleged or actual discrimination by religious organizations
cannot be verified.
193 Brennen, Tax Expenditures, supra note 41, at 169.
"9 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-l(a) (2000) ("This subchapter shall not apply to an employer with
respect to the employment of aliens outside any State, or to a religious corporation, association,
educational institution, or society with respect to the employment of individuals of a particular
religion to perform work connected with the carrying on by such corporation, association, edu-
cational institution, or society of its activities.").
Minow, supra note 184, at 808-10. Professor Minow astutely noted that "[a]lthough
claims of discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation have not generated victories for
plaintiffs suing religious organizations, neither have they done much to clarify the law." Id.
at 808.
196 See supra text accompanying notes 59-63.
197 The First Amendment provides, in part, that "Congress shall make no law respecting
an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof." U.S. CONST. amend. I;
see also Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971).
198 See infra notes 368-72 and accompanying text.
2009]
WILLIAM & MARY BILL OF RIGHTS JOURNAL
not clear."9 These concerns arise from churches' purely religious mission and pur-
pose, which is not necessarily present in the broader context of religious organizations
whose purpose and mission may also encompass education, health, or social services.
In applying the public policy doctrine, which is akin to a nondiscrimination require-
ment, the Supreme Court alluded to this distinction and a possible disparate outcome
if the discriminating organization had been a church, stating that: "We deal here only
with religious schools-not with churches or other purely religious institutions. 2 °
Accordingly, this Article continues the proposal set forth in my prior article to exempt
churches from the requirement, but more narrowly define the term "church." This
narrow definition "should reflect the [IRS] fifteen-point test, with specific emphasis
on the criterion of an established and dynamic congregation." 20' A church would
only be exempt to the extent that the imposition of the discrimination requirement
would be inconsistent with its established tenets or creed.20 2 However, as previously
stated, a church's professed tenets or creed cannot be questioned and must be accepted
as genuine, absent a clear showing otherwise, to allay any potential claims under the
First Amendment's religion clauses. 203
The intent of the proposed nondiscrimination requirement is not to control or
regulate the sincerely held religious beliefs of church members or those with whom
they share their beliefs. 2 4 Rather, it is to eliminate the use of tax-deductible dollars,
and other benefits received by charitable and religious organizations pursuant to
§ 501(c)(3), to support or maintain discrimination against members of society.2 5
Accordingly, with respect to religious organizations, the most viable means of
effecting this nondiscrimination proposal is to more narrowly define the statutory
term "integrated auxiliary," thereby limiting the religious organizations functionally
treated as churches under the Code.2°6
'99 See infra Part III.B.
200 Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S. 574, 604 n.29 (1983) (emphasis omitted).
201 See Mirkay, Charities & Discrimination, supra note 5, at 100. To implement such an
exemption, the article provided that § 501(c)(3) could be amended to include the following
subparagraph: "In the case of a church, as defined in section 508(c)(1)(A), this shall not apply
to the extent that the application would not be consistent with the church's established tenets
or creed." Id. at 100 n.325.
202 Id.
203 See supra notes 93-94 and accompanying text.
204 Mirkay, Charities & Discrimination, supra note 5, at 100.
205 Id. at 52-53.
206 Admittedly, this course of action does not address those activities that a church operates
within its own legal entity; in other words, those activities not conducted in an entity separate
from the church. Presumably, churches will still desire to operate activities in separate legal
entities due to liability concerns, in which case a narrow definition of a church and, specifically,
an integrated auxiliary, will subject at least some of those activities and entities to a nondiscrim-
ination restriction. But see Rev. Rul. 75-231, 1975-1 C.B. 158, where the IRS determined that
the public policy doctrine could be used to deny or revoke the exempt status of a church that
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In attempting to draw a narrow definition of a church and its integrated auxiliaries,
both the invalidated "principal activity" test of the 1977 regulations and its replace-
ment, the internal support test, offer some valuable insights.2° In Lutheran Social
Service of Minnesota v. United States, the Eighth Circuit determined that the "exclu-
sively religious" component of the principal activity test in the 1977 regulations was
contrary to congressional intent and "inconsistent with the legislative history of sec-
tion 6033. ' '208 In addition to a statutory construction argument, the court reasoned
that church-affiliated youth groups and men's and women's clubs-examples of
integrated auxiliaries provided in the Senate and Conference Committee Reports from
the 1969 Act-were "no more 'exclusively religious"' than the plaintiff, a church-
affiliated social service agency.2' However, those committee reports also listed
mission societies and religious schools as examples of integrated auxiliaries, both
of which can arguably be interpreted as predominantly religious in nature and less
secular than a social service agency. 21° Therefore, the interpretation of what consti-
tutes religious activity can be very subjective.
In substituting a less subjective internal support test for the exclusively religious
principal activity test, the IRS borrowed from the financial support standard set forth
in § 3121 (w), "which permits certain church-related exempt organizations to elect out
of social security coverage." 2 ' Section 3121 (w) disallows an election for any church-
controlled organizations that offer goods, services, or facilities for sale to the general
public and receive greater than twenty-five percent of their support from such sales
or governmental sources, or both.2 12 The legislative history provides that:
[M]any church-controlled organizations (including church-
controlled universities and religious hospitals) provide services
to the general public which are similar in nature to those provided
by other, secular institutions. Allowing an election in these cases
would result in differing treatment for employees of religious and
secular organizations performing essentially similar functions ....
Further, where an organization sells its services to the general
operated a racially discriminatory school within its own corporate entity because the school
was not separately incorporated. In enacting Revenue Rule 75-231, the IRS relied on Reynolds
v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 166-67 (1878), and subsequent Supreme Court cases that con-
cluded that, although the Free Exercise Clause bars government interference into religious
beliefs, it does not necessarily "affect the legal consequences otherwise attending a given
practice or action that is not inherently religious." Rev. Rul. 75-231, 1975-1 C.B. 158.
207 See supra note 162.
208 758 F.2d 1283, 1290-91 (8th Cir. 1985).
209 Id. at 1291.
210 See supra note 140 and accompanying text.
211 T.D. 8640, 1996-1 C.B. 289.
212 I.R.C. § 3121(w)(3)(B) (2000).
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public, concerns regarding the separation of church and state
become less pressing.1 3
To address these concerns, § 3121(w)(3) narrowly defines the eligibility of church-
controlled organizations for the exemption election based on their activities and fund-
ing sources.214 Congress concluded that these § 3121(w) rules "provide a fair, ob-
jective test for determining those organizations entitled to make an election without
questioning the religious connection of any particular organization.""2 '
The primary issue raised with respect to the internal support test adopted in both
Revenue Procedure 86-23 and the current regulations under § 6033 is the reason the
IRS used a fifty percent maximum threshold for permissible non-church funding
rather than the twenty-five percent threshold used in § 3121(w)(3). Neither the rev-
enue procedure nor the explanations under the notice of proposed rulemaking and
final regulations offer any significant insights other than stating that the financial sup-
port requirement in the revenue procedure "is similar to, but more favorable than, the
financial support requirement in section 3121 (w)."2 6 If integrated auxiliaries are truly
intended to have a substantial connection with a church or convention of churches,
one possible solution to ensuring that more church-affiliated entities are subject to
the nondiscrimination requirement is to lower the maximum threshold of non-church
funding. For example, the regulations could be amended to permit only those organi-
zations whose funding from non-church sources does not exceed ten or twenty percent
of their total support to be eligible for integrated auxiliary treatment.2"7 At a mini-
mum, a twenty-percent threshold would inversely comport with the required percent-
age ownership of related for-profit corporations desiring to file a single, consolidated
return.218 To avoid any confusion regarding applicability, such a restriction should
be codified in § 508 or § 6033, as was done with § 3121(w), rather than governed
solely by regulations.
If Congress's intent in § 3121(w) was only to grant exemption to organizations
with closely controlled church affiliations, such reasoning should equally apply in the
context of limiting the grant of church tax exemption benefits, including an exemption
from a statutory nondiscrimination requirement. Furthermore, as with the § 3121(w)
test, reducing the amount of non-church funding for integrated auxiliary status attempts
to "provide a fair, objective test.., without questioning the religious connection of
213 STAFF OF JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, 98TH CONG., GENERAL EXPLANATION OF THE
REVENUE PROVISIONS OF THE DEFIcrr REDUCTION Acr 1214 (Comm. Print 1984).
214 Id.
215 id.
216 Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.6033-2, 59 Fed. Reg. 64,633 (Dec. 15, 1994).
217 See Whelan, supra note 110, at 924 n.159 (suggesting that organizations seeking to be
integrated auxiliaries should not derive more than fifteen percent of their current operating
budget from state or federal sources).
218 See I.R.C. § 1504(a)(2) (2000).
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any particular organization." '219 Finally, in addition to more effectively addressing
discrimination concerns, a lower non-church-funding threshold would further accom-
plish the congressional goal of providing increased opportunity for public inspection,
and therefore greater transparency, of even more tax-exempt organizations.220
111. THE CONSTTnTONALITY OF IMPOSING A SECTION 501(c)(3)
NONDISCRIMINATION REQUIREMENT ON RELIGIOUS ORGANIZATIONS
A. First Amendment, Generally
221
The imposition of a nondiscrimination requirement on § 501 (c)(3) organizations
raises potential constitutional issues, primarily under the First Amendment. 222 Particu-
lar to religious organizations, the First Amendment's two religion clauses-the Free
Exercise Clause and the Establishment Clause--come into consideration, as discussed
below.223 Nevertheless, one of the major criticisms of a nondiscrimination require-
ment is that it would violate an organization's First Amendment free speech and asso-
ciation rights, because it "would significantly affect... [an organization's] ability to
advocate public or private viewpoints."'224 While the Supreme Court has not directly
addressed this issue,225 it has upheld other restrictions on exempt organizations' activ-
ities as conditions to exemption under § 501(c)(3), and has dismissed claims that such
219 STAFF OF JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, 98TH CONG., GENERAL EXPLANATION OF THE
REVENUE PROVISIONS OF THE DEFICrr REDUCTION AcT 1214 (Comm. Print 1984).
220 See supra note 167 and accompanying text.
221 Portions of the discussion in this subpart are substantially similar to a corresponding
discussion contained in Mirkay, Charities & Discrimination, supra note 5, at 88-94.
222 The First Amendment provides, "Congress shall make no law respecting an establish-
ment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech,
or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the
Government for a redress of grievances." U.S. CONST. amend. I. The amendment applies to
state governments by operation of the Fourteenth Amendment. See Everson v. Bd. of Educ.,
330 U.S. 1 (1947).
223 See infra Part ILl.B.
224 Boy Scouts of Am. v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640,650 (2000); see, e.g., Erez Reuveni, On Boy
Scouts and Anti-Discrimination Law: The Associational Rights of Quasi-Religious Organi-
zations, 86 B.U. L. REv. 109, 113 (2006) (contending that "quasi-religious" organizations like
the Boy Scouts deserve "greater associational protections" under the First Amendment than
purely secular organizations); Roy Whitehead, Jr. & Walter Block, The Boy Scouts, Freedom
ofAssociation, and the Right to Discriminate: A Legal, Philosophical, and Economic Analysis,
29 OKLA. CrrY U. L. REv. 851,882 (2004) ("Freedom of association is a necessary condition of
a civilized order; laws prohibiting discrimination violate this freedom and must be repealed.").
223 David A. Brennen, Charities and the Constitution: Evaluating the Role of Constitutional
Principles in Determining the Scope of Tax Law's Public Policy Limitation for Charities, 5
FLA. TAX REv. 779, 843 (2002); see also Mirkay, Charities & Discrimination, supra note
5, at 88-89.
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restrictions constitute First Amendment violations.226 In discussing the interaction
of constitutional rights and the income tax exemption, it is important to note that tax
exemption is typically regarded as a congressional grant, not a constitutional right.
227
One fundamental issue under First Amendment free speech analysis is whether the
government can compel an organization to surrender its constitutional rights as a con-
dition to receiving a public benefit, such as a tax exemption. 28 In Christian Echoes
National Ministries v. United States, a religious organization challenged the revocation
of its tax exemption due to its substantial lobbying and political campaign activities
in violation of § 501(c)(3).22 9 The Tenth Circuit disagreed with the Ministries' asser-
tion that the lobbying and political campaign restrictions in § 501(c)(3) constituted
unconstitutional conditions on its free speech rights:
In light of the fact that tax exemption is a privilege, a matter of
grace rather than right, we hold that the limitations contained in
Section 501(c)(3) withholding exemption from nonprofit corpora-
tions do not deprive Christian Echoes of its constitutionally guar-
anteed right of free speech. The taxpayer may engage in all such
activities without restraint, subject, however, to withholding of
the exemption or, in the alternative, the taxpayer may refrain from
such activities and obtain the privilege of exemption.23°
Similar reasoning was employed by the Supreme Court in Regan v. Taxation
With Representation of Washington.23' Taxation With Representation of Washington
(TWR), a nonprofit organization, applied for, and was denied, § 501 (c)(3) tax-exempt
status due to its substantial lobbying activities.232 In addressing TWR's argument that
the lobbying limitation violated its First Amendment rights, 233 the Court first charac-
terized tax exemptions and the charitable contributions deduction as subsidies, analo-
gizing such benefits to cash grants to the organization.234 The Court further clarified
226 See Brennen, supra note 225, at 843-44; infra notes 230-58 and accompanying text.
227 See Comm'r v. Sullivan, 356 U.S. 27, 28 (1958); Christian Echoes Nat'l Ministry, Inc.
v. United States, 470 F.2d 849, 857 (10th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 864 (1973).
228 Oliver S. Thomas, The Power to Destroy: The Eroding Constitutional Arguments for
Church Tax Exemption and the Practical Effect on Churches, 22 CUMB. L. REv. 605, 618
(1992); see Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513, 515-18 (1958) (holding that the State of
California could not compel veterans to sign a loyalty oath as a condition to qualifying for
a special property tax exemption for veterans).
229 470 F.2d 852-53.
230 Id. at 857.
231 461 U.S. 540 (1983).
232 Id. at 542.
233 Id.
234 Id. at 544. For additional references on equating tax exemption and the charitable con-
tributions deduction with government subsidies, see sources cited supra note 41.
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that Congress decided to more extensively subsidize nonprofit organizations' public
welfare programs rather than their lobbying activities.235 Although it agreed with
TWR's assertion that "the government may not deny a benefit to a person because
he exercises a constitutional right, 236 the Court explained that the Code did not re-
strict TWR's ability to receive deductible contributions in support of its non-lobbying
activities; Congress simply declined to finance lobbying activities with public funds.237
The Court further rejected the "notion that First Amendment rights are somehow not
fully realized unless they are subsidized by the State. "238
Significantly, the Regan Court reminded TWR that it still qualified for a tax ex-
emption under § 501 (c)(4) as a social-welfare organization, and that it could obtain
deductible contributions for its nonlobbying activities by returning to the dual struc-
ture from which it originated 239: two nonprofit corporations, one of which was tax-
exempt under § 501 (c)(3) and the other of which was tax-exempt under § 501 (c)(4).240
The Court did, however, caution that the § 501(c)(3) organization should not sub-
sidize the § 501(c)(4) entity, "otherwise, public funds might be spent on an activity
Congress chose not to subsidize."24'
In his concurrence, Justice Harry Blackmun noted that "§ 501(c)(3) organizations
retain their constitutional right to speak and to petition the Government" and agreed
with the majority that a § 501 (c)(3) organization can preserve both its tax exemption
and its free speech rights by utilizing an affiliated § 501 (c)(4) organization to carry
out its lobbying pursuits.242 Nevertheless, Justice Blackmun still cautioned that
[s]hould the IRS attempt to limit the control these organizations
exercise over the lobbying of their § 501(c)(4) affiliates, the
First Amendment problems would be insurmountable. It hardly
answers one person's objection to a restriction on his speech that
another person, outside his control, may speak for him. Similarly,
235 Regan, 461 U.S. at 544.
236 Id. at 545.
237 Id. at 545-46 (citing Cammarano v. United States, 358 U.S. 498 (1959) (involving a
treasury regulation that forbade business deductions for lobbying expenses)).
238 Id. at 546 (citing Cammarano, 358 U.S. at 515 (Douglas, J., concurring)).
239 Id. at 544.
24 Id. The two nonprofit corporations merged to form Taxation With Representation of
Washington. Id. at 543; cf. FCC v. League of Women Voters, 468 U.S. 364,399-400 (1984)
(finding that because a noncommercial educational broadcasting station was unable to prac-
tically separate its political and exempt activities into distinct § 501(c)(3) and § 501(c)(4) orga-
nizations, the federal law conditioning funding on the station's forbearance of its right to
editorialize was an unconstitutional penalty).
24' Regan, 461 U.S. at 544. To do so, the two entities should be "separately incorporated
and keep records adequate to show that tax-deductible contributions are not used to pay for
lobbying." Id. at 545 n.6.
242 Id. at 553 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
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an attempt to prevent § 501(c)(4) organizations from lobbying ex-
plicitly on behalf of their § 501 (c)(3) affiliates would perpetuate
§ 501(c)(3) organizations' inability to make known their views
on legislation without incurring the unconstitutional penalty. Such
restrictions would extend far beyond Congress' mere refusal to
subsidize lobbying.243
In other words, § 501(c)(4) arguably provides a constitutional safety hatch when
imposing restrictions on the activities and possible constitutional rights of charitable
organizations.
After Regan, churches attempted to distinguish the decision on the basis that
applying the statutory restrictions on lobbying and political campaign activities to
religious organizations implicated additional constitutional issues. 42 " However, as
evidenced in the D.C. Circuit's decision in Branch Ministries v. Rossotti,245 religious
organizations "appear to be on an equal footing with their secular counterparts" with
respect to free speech challenges to the activity restrictions within § 501(c)(3). 246
In Branch Ministries, a tax-exempt church, conducting business as the Church at
Pierce Creek (CPC), placed a full-page advertisement in two newspapers four days
before the 1992 presidential election.247 The advertisements urged Christians to vote
against the Democratic candidate Bill Clinton because of his "positions on certain
moral issues. 2 4' Each advertisement attributed co-sponsorship to CPC and solicited
tax-deductible donations in support of its cause.249 In response, the IRS invoked a
statutorily prescribed church-tax inquiry,25 followed by a church-tax examination.25
Ultimately concluding that the placement of the advertisements violated the statutory
prohibition on political campaign activity, the IRS revoked CPC's § 501(c)(3) tax-
exempt status.252 CPC challenged the revocation, alleging that the revocation violated
243 id.
24 Thomas, supra note 228, at 625.
245 211 F.3d 137 (D.C. Cir. 2000).
246 Thomas, supra note 228, at 626.
247 Branch Ministries, 211 F.3d at 139.
248 Id. Each advertisement displayed the headline "Christians Beware" and declared that
Clinton's stances on abortion, homosexuality, and the distribution of condoms to teenage
students were contrary to "Biblical precepts." Id. at 140.
249 Id.
250 See id. Specific statutory rules govern the IRS's ability to audit churches. See I.R.C.
§ 7611 (2000). A "church tax inquiry" may only be initiated by an appropriate IRS official
(typically, a regional commissioner or person of higher rank within the IRS) who "reasonably
believes, on the basis of facts and circumstances recorded in writing, that the organization may
not qualify for tax exemption as a church" because of certain nonexempt activities. HOPKINS,
supra note 48, § 26.6(c); see also I.R.C. § 761 l(a)(1)(A), (a)(2).
25 See Branch Ministries, 211 F.3d at 140; see also I.R.C. § 761 1(h)(3).
252 Branch Ministries, 211 F.3d at 140.
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its free exercise and free speech rights under the Religious Freedom Restoration Act
of 1993 and the First Amendment.253
With respect to the free speech claim, the D.C. Circuit, relying on Regan, con-
cluded that CPC had "an alternate means of communication" through the formation
and operation of an affiliated organization exempt under § 501(c)(4).5 The court
explained that, while they are subject to a similar ban on political campaign activities,
§ 501 (c)(4) organizations may form a political action committee that can participate
in political campaigns without limitation.255 Still, the court reminded CPC that it could
not channel its tax-deductible contributions to fund the political action committee
because Congress chose not to subsidize such First Amendment activities."
As in Justice Blackmun' s concurrence in Regan, which deemed the availability
of a § 501 (c)(4) organization as an alternate means of communication to be "essential
to the constitutionality of § 501(c)(3)'s restrictions on lobbying," 7 Branch Ministries
relied on this availability to sustain the constitutionality of § 501(c)(3)'s prohibition
on political campaign activities.258 Accordingly, it seems probable that these alternate
means of communication might be of similar utility in sustaining the constitutionality
of a nondiscrimination requirement in § 501 (c)(3) with respect to religious organiza-
tions. As with the lobbying and political campaign restrictions, a religious organiza-
tion would be free to discriminate in the activities conducted within a § 501(c)(4)
affiliate without jeopardizing its tax benefits as to its nondiscriminatory activities.
Professor Eugene Volokh, a constitutional law scholar, comprehensively addressed
whether the government may limit its "subsidies"--direct grants, tax exemptions and
deductions, and access to government property-to organizations or groups that do
not discriminate on a wide variety of bases.2 5 9 He acknowledged that discrimination
on the basis of race, ethnicity, religion, sex, or sexual orientation may often be a con-
stitutional right, as the Supreme Court concluded in Boy Scouts ofAmerica v. Dale.2 6°
253 Id. at 140-41. See infra notes 306-10 and accompanying text for a discussion on CPC's
free exercise claim.
254 See Branch Ministries, 211 F.3d at 143 (citing Regan v. Taxation With Representation
of Wash., 461 U.S. 540, 552 (1983)).
255 Id. (citing Treas. Reg. § 1.527-6(f) to (g) (1980)). The court reminded CPC that the
"related § 501 (c)(4) organization must be separately incorporated; and it must maintain records
that will demonstrate that tax-deductible contributions to the Church have not been used to
support the political activities conducted by the § 501(c)(4) organization's political action
arm." Id.
256 Id. at 143-44 (citing Regan, 461 U.S. at 548).
257 Id. at 143 (citing Regan, 461 U.S. at 552-53 (Blackmun, J., concurring)).
258 Id.
" See Eugene Volokh, Freedom of Expressive Association and Government Subsidies,
58 STAN. L. REv. 1919, 1920 (2006). Professor Volokh preliminarily concludes that federal
and state tax exemptions, including the charitable contributions deduction, are "tantamount
to a matching grant." Id. at 1920 n. 1; see also supra note 41.
26 Volokh, supra note 259 (citing Boy Scouts of Am. v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640,644 (2000)
(holding that New Jersey's public-accommodations law, which prohibited discrimination on
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Nevertheless, he opined that the government may have a completely plausible reason
for imposing a nondiscrimination condition on subsidy eligibility; namely, "the com-
monly held view that discrimination is generally wrong and thus generally should not
be subsidized by the government.
26
'
Similar to the reasoning espoused in Christian Echoes and Regan, Volokh cen-
tered his First Amendment analysis on his "No Duty to Subsidize Principle," which
provides that the government is not constitutionally required to fund the exercise of
constitutionally-granted freedoms and rights.262 However, his principle will govern,
provided that it does not constitute governmental viewpoint or religious discrimina-
tion.263 In other words, the government may not differentiate among speakers based
on their viewpoint or exclude religious conduct from governmental subsidies when
it funds "equivalent secular conduct. '264
With respect to governmental viewpoint discrimination, Volokh provided the
following example:
Excluding the Boy Scouts and all other discriminating groups
from a government charitable fund drive is content-neutral and
generally permissible. Excluding only the Scouts, but not other
groups that equally violate the antidiscrimination policy, may
show that the government is acting because of the viewpoint the
Scouts express and not because of the discriminatory actions that
the Scouts take.265
In the context of governmental religious discrimination, Volokh acknowledged
that a nondiscrimination requirement could affect religious organizations more than
secular ones, because "religious groups would derive more benefit from the ability
to discriminate based on religious ideology."2" However, he noted that laws that
prohibit certain practices that are central to a religious group's rituals yield the same
result, as illustrated in the following example:
Peyote laws, for instance, have a more serious effect on religious
groups that see peyote use as a sacrament than on most secular
the basis of sexual orientation, violated the Boy Scouts' First Amendment rights-specif-
ically, the freedom of expressive association-and upholding the organization's right to exclude
homosexuals from its membership)).
26 Id. at 1934; see, e.g., Ian Urbina, Boy Scouts Lose Philadelphia Lease in Gay-Rights
Fight, N.Y. TIMEs, Dec. 6, 2007, at A26.
262 Volokh, supra note 259, at 1922; see also Regan v. Taxation With Representation of
Wash., 461 U.S. 540, 547-49 (1983).
263 Volokh, supra note 259, at 1922.
264 Id.
265 Id. at 1931 (citations omitted).
266 Id. at 1937.
[Vol. 17:715
LOSING OUR RELIGION
groups whose members may just want to experiment with peyote.
Yet such a disparate impact, even when it substantially burdens
a group's exercise of religion, does not even render unconstitu-
tional criminal prohibitions of practices. It surely wouldn't bar
the exclusion from benefit programs of groups that engage in
those practices.267
Therefore, Volokh ultimately determined that the viewpoint and religious discrimi-
nation exceptions to his "No Duty to Subsidize Principle" do not effectively prevent
the government from instituting nondiscrimination conditions on subsidies it provides,
such as tax exemption.268
B. The First Amendment's Two Religion Clauses
The federal income tax exemption of religious organizations, including any re-
striction on that exemption, raises two additional fundamental constitutional issues,
269
both of which arise under the First Amendment's two religion clauses-the Establish-
ment Clause and the Free Exercise Clause.270 The Establishment Clause essentially
disallows "governmentally established religion,"271 while the Free Exercise Clause
forbids "governmental interference with religion. 272 Supreme Court jurisprudence
reflects the distinct separateness of these two clauses, creating a tension discussed
ad infinitum by legal scholars.273 Specifically, the Supreme Court has acknowledged
its own dilemma in finding "a neutral course between the two Religion Clauses, both
of which are cast in absolute terms, and either of which, if expanded to a logical ex-
treme, would tend to clash with each other."274 The tension also exists within each
clause itself. For example, while clearly stating that the Establishment Clause does
267 Id. (citations omitted).
268 Id. at 1922-23; see also Mary E. Becker, The Politics of Women's Wrongs and the Bill
of "Rights": A Bicentennial Perspective, 59 U. CHI. L. REv. 453,484-85 (1992) (proposing
the loss of tax exemption for organizations that employ gender discrimination in choosing their
leaders); cf Richard W. Garnett, A Quiet Faith? Taxes, Politics, and the Privatization of
Religion, 42 B.C. L. REV. 771, 796 (2001) (arguing that, by placing restrictions on religious
organizations' exemption, "government subtly reshapes religious consciousness itself").
269 Gaffney, Federal Taxation, supra note 121, at 412.
270 U.S. CONST. amend. I.
27' Kenneth C. Halcom, Taxing God, 38 McGEORGEL. REv. 729,745 (2007) (citing Walz
v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664, 669 (1970)).
272 Walz, 397 U.S. at 669.
273 See, e.g., Edward McGlynn Gaffney, Jr., Exemption of Religious Communities from
State and Local Taxation, in RELIGIOUS ORGANIZATIONS IN THE UNITED STATES, supra note
121, at 459, 470; Halcom, supra note 271 (citing MICHAEL W. MCCONNELL Er AL., RELIGION
AND THE CONSTrrUTION (2002)); Witte, supra note 50, at 364.
274 Walz, 397 U.S. at 668-69.
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not prohibit tax exemption for religious organizations,275 the Supreme Court has also
ruled that a tax exemption granted only to religious organizations does violate the
clause.276 Similarly, in the context of the Free Exercise Clause, the Supreme Court
has upheld the imposition of a generally applicable sales tax on religious organiza-
tions' materials, but the extent to which such imposition of tax would survive any free
exercise challenges is subject to conjecture.277 Accordingly, the effect of these two
religion clauses on restricting the income tax exemption of religious organizations
pursuant to § 501(c)(3) requires further and more detailed exploration.
1. Free Exercise Clause
Free exercise cases typically involve a clash between a person's religious beliefs
and a secular law.2 78 Traditional Free Exercise Clause analysis prohibits any
government action that substantially burdens religious practices.279 Provided the
claimant establishes that her conduct is compelled by a sincerely held religious
belief and the government has burdened this conduct in some way, the burden of
proof shifts to the government to prove that it has acted in the least burdensome way
possible in furthering its compelling interest. 28° The United States Supreme Court's
decisions in Murdock v. Pennsylvania (City of Jeannette)28 ' and Follett v. Town of
McCormick282 employed this traditional analysis.283 Both cases involved local
municipal ordinances that imposed a flat license tax or fee on the sale of merchan-
dise within the city or town. These license taxes were imposed on Jehovah's
Witnesses distributing religious literature.2" In both cases, the Supreme Court
275 Id. at 664.
276 Tex. Monthly, Inc. v. Bullock, 489 U.S. 1, 14 (1989).
277 Jimmy Swaggart Ministries v. Bd. of Equalization of Cal., 493 U.S. 378 (1990); see
also Halcom, supra note 271, at 746.
278 HOPKINS, supra note 48, § 10.1(a)(i).
279 Thomas, supra note 228, at 609 (citing Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963) (finding
an unconstitutional denial of unemployment benefits due to a member of the Seventh-Day
Adventist Church who resisted working on Saturdays in accordance with her religious beliefs);
Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972) (discussing the unconstitutionality of requiring
Amish parents to send their grade school graduates to high school)).
2 Sherbert, 374 U.S. at 403-07.
281 319 U.S. 105 (1943).
282 321 U.S. 573 (1944).
283 Murdock and Follett are typically viewed as cases implicating the free exercise of
religion, but as some legal scholars observe, "[Tihe results [in both cases] are also harmo-
nious with the requirements of the nonestablishment provision." Edward McGlynn Gaffney,
Jr., Exemption of Religious Communities from State and Local Taxation, in RELiGIOUS
ORGANIZATIONS IN THE UNITED STATEs, supra note 121, at 476. The author later opines that
"[n]either Murdock nor Follett yielded opinions grounded in both nonestablishment and free
exercise concerns." Id. at 477.
24 Follett, 321 U.S. at 574; Murdock, 319 U.S. at 106.
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found that the imposition of the tax violated the petitioners' First Amendment rights
to freely exercise their religion. 85 Although, as the dissents pointed out, the chal-
lenged license taxes were generally applicable to all persons and religiously
neutral,286 these taxes were ultimately struck down because they constituted "prior
restraint[s] on the free exercise of religious beliefs. 287
Distinguishing Murdock and Follett in light of more recent Supreme Court cases,
some legal scholars opine that the First Amendment's Free Exercise Clause does not
absolutely require that religious organizations be exempt from taxation.2 88 In fact,
the Murdock Court cautioned that its decision did not mean that "religious groups...
are free from all financial burdens of government." 289 Based on the Supreme Court's
decision in Employment Division v. Smith,290 a broadly applicable and religion-neutral
tax should not raise free exercise concerns nor compel a local or state government to
grant an exemption to any individual or organization, provided it does not constitute
a prior restraint on religious activity.29' As the Supreme Court reasoned in Smith,
"if prohibiting the exercise of religion (or burdening the activity of printing) is not the
object of the tax but merely the incidental effect of a generally applicable and other-
wise valid provision, the First Amendment has not been offended."'292 As explained by
one legal scholar, "Smith understood the Free Exercise Clause to provide an 'equality'
right-a requirement of special justification for the discriminatory burdening of reli-
gious exercise-rather than a 'substantive' right-a requirement of special justification
for any burdening... of religious exercise."293 Accordingly, under Smith, the govern-
ment cannot impose a nondiscrimination condition on § 501(c)(3) tax-exempt status
only as to religious organizations, but it can impose and enforce such a condition as
to all organizations seeking exemption thereunder.294
This distinction is best exemplified by the decision in Jimmy Swaggart Ministries
v. Board of Equalization, in which the Supreme Court unanimously determined that
285 Follett, 321 U.S. at 573; Murdock, 319 U.S. at 112.
286 See Murdock, 319 U.S. at 118 (Reed, J., dissenting) ("No evidence is offered to show the
amount is oppressive .... There is no contention in any of these cases that such discrimination
is practiced in the application of the ordinances.").
287 Halcom, supra note 271, at 751.
288 Id. at 750 (citing JOHNE. NowAK&RONALDD. ROTUNDA, CONSTrrUTIONALLAW § 17.8
(2000)). However, in Walz, Justice Burger asserted that tax exemption "operated affirmatively
to help guarantee the free exercise of all forms of religious belief." Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397
U.S. 664, 678 (1970).
289 Murdock, 319 U.S. at 112.
290 494 U.S. 872 (1990).
291 Halcom, supra note 271, at 750 (citing JOHN E. NOwAK & RONALD D. ROTUNDA,
CONsTITUTIONAL LAW § 17.8 (2000)). See generally Jimmy Swaggart Ministries v. Bd. of
Equalization, 493 U.S. 378 (1990).
292 Employment Div., 494 U.S. at 878.
293 Patrick J. Schiltz & Douglas Laycock, Employment in Religious Organizations, in
RELIGIOUS ORGANIZATIONS IN THE UNITED STATES, supra note 121, at 527, 549.
294 Id. at 549-50.
20091
WILLIAM & MARY BILL OF RIGHTS JOURNAL
a California sales and use tax that was broadly applied and religiously neutral did not
offend the Free Exercise Clause.295 More importantly, the Court stated that the Free
Exercise Clause "does not require the State to grant appellant an exemption" from a
generally applicable tax.296 In so stating, the Court distinguished Murdock and Follett
on the basis that the flat-tax or license fee at issue in those cases "operate[d] as a prior
restraint on the free exercise of religious beliefs. '297 The Court cautioned, however,
that "a more onerous tax rate, even if generally applicable," could raise free exercise
concerns. 29' Although the Court did not speculate as to when a tax rate would be
"onerous,"299it did note earlier in its opinion that the California tax constituted only
a "small fraction of any retail sale."3"
A free exercise claim was also raised in Bob Jones University v. United States.301
In response to the university's argument that the public-policy doctrine violated its
First Amendment free exercise rights, the Supreme Court affirmed that certain compel-
ling governmental interests can justify regulating certain religious conduct.30 2 In find-
ing that the government's interest in eradicating racial discrimination in education
was sufficiently compelling to overcome any First Amendment concerns, the Court
concluded that the "[d]enial of tax benefits will inevitably have a substantial impact
on the operation of private religious schools, but will not prevent those schools from
observing their religious tenets. ' ' The Court alluded to a disparate outcome if the
claimant had been a church,3 4 stating that: "We deal here only with religious schools-
not with churches or other purely religious institutions; here, the governmental interest
is in denying public support to racial discrimination in education.
In Branch Ministries, CPC raised a free exercise claim with regard to the rev-
ocation of its tax-exempt status due to prohibited political campaign activity. °6 In
response to that claim, the D.C. Circuit found that CPC failed to establish that the
295 Jimmy Swaggart Ministries, 493 U.S. at 389-90.
296 Id. at 392.
297 Id. at 389.
298 Id. at 392.
299 Id.
31 Id. at 389; see also Halcom, supra note 271, at 751-52.
301 461 U.S. 574 (1983).
302 Id. at 603. The Court relied, in part, on Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158 (1944),
which held that "neutrally cast child labor laws prohibiting sale of printed materials on public
streets could be applied to prohibit children from dispensing religious literature." Bob Jones
Univ., 461 U.S. at 603.
303 Bob Jones Univ., 461 U.S. at 603-4)4. The Court further concluded that the government's
interest "substantially outweighs whatever burden denial of tax benefits places on petitioners'
exercise of their religious beliefs. The interests asserted by [the university] cannot be accommo-
dated with that compelling governmental interest, and no 'less restrictive means' are available
to achieve the governmental interest." Id. at 604 (citations omitted).
3' Thomas, supra note 228, at 614.
305 Bob Jones Univ., 461 U.S. at 604 n.29.
" Branch Ministries v. Rossotti, 211 F.3d 137, 140-41 (D.C. Cir. 2000).
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revocation had substantially burdened its free exercise rights and the lack of a com-
pelling governmental interest justifying such a burden." The court further concluded
that CPC' s loss of its exemption for violating the political campaign prohibition did
not constitute an unconstitutional burden on its free exercise rights. This would only
be true, explained the court, "if the receipt of the privilege (in this case the tax exemp-
tion) is conditioned 'upon conduct proscribed by a religious faith, or... denie[d] ...
because of conduct mandated by religious belief, thereby putting substantial pressure
on an adherent to modify his behavior and to violate his beliefs." 08 The court con-
cluded that the revocation would only result in decreased funds to support CPC's reli-
gious practices. However, the Supreme Court had previously determined that this
financial burden lacked constitutional significance. 309 Furthermore, the court found
that CPC's alleged burden was exaggerated because of the special treatment churches
receive under the Code, thereby rendering the revocation's impact "more symbolic
than substantial."3 10
Accordingly, based on the above case law, provided a tax (I) does not constitute a
prior restraint on religious activity, (ii) does not have as its primary purpose to impede
such activity, (iii) is applied in a broad and religiously neutral manner, and (iv) does
not impose too high of a rate, neither the taxation of, nor a restriction on an exemption
granted to, religious organizations, should likely raise any free exercise concerns.
However, Professor Volokh raised a perplexing dilemma with respect to free
exercise concerns implicated by a nondiscrimination condition on government sub-
sidies-namely, the effect of the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA) and its
state counterparts."' As previously explained, the Supreme Court's 1990 decision
in Employment Division v. Smith ostensibly ended any free exercise concerns with
307 See id. at 142 (citing Jimmy Swaggart Ministries v. Bd. of Equalization, 493 U.S. 378,
384-85 (1990) ("[T]he free exercise inquiry asks whether government has placed a substantial
burden on the observation of a central religious belief or practice and, if so, whether a com-
pelling governmental interest justifies the burden.")); see also 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-l(a) to (b)
(2000), invalidated in part by City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997) (providing that
the government can only substantially burden a person's exercise of religion if that burden
is "in furtherance of a compelling governmental interest" and "is the least restrictive means
of furthering" that interest).
'0' Branch Ministries, 211 F.3d at 142 (quoting Jimmy Swaggart Ministries, 493 U.S. at
391-92).
" Id. (quoting Jimmy Swaggart Ministries, 493 U.S. at 391); see also Hernandez v.
Comm'r, 490 U.S. 680, 700 (1989) ("[P]etitioners' claimed exemption stems from the con-
tention that an incrementally larger tax burden interferes with their religious activities. This
argument knows no limitation.").
3 0 Branch Ministries, 211 F.3d at 142. The court further explained that, if CPC did not inter-
vene in future political campaigns, it could "hold itself out as a 501(c)(3) organization and
receive all the benefits of that status. All that will have been lost, in that event, is the advance
assurance of deductibility in the event a donor should be audited." Id. at 142-43.
311 Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993,42 U.S.C. § 2000bb- 1 (2000), invalidated
in part by City of Boeme v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997); see supra note 307.
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respect to tax exemption." 2 Smith held that "if prohibiting the exercise of religion...
is not the object of the tax but merely the incidental effect of a generally applicable
and otherwise valid provision, the First Amendment has not been offended."3 13 In
response to the appeal of a broad coalition of religious organizations,3"4 the federal
government enacted the RFRA, which was modeled after pre-Smith case law that
granted exemptions from generally applicable laws, including subsidies, to religious
objectors pursuant to the Free Exercise Clause.315 By providing a remedy to these
religious objectors, the RFRA "shifted the burden of proof.., back to the govern-
ment. '' 316 A number of states followed the RFRA either by enacting legislation or by
interpreting their state constitutions to hold similarly that the "[g]overnment shall not
substantially burden a person's exercise of religion even if the burden results from a
rule of general applicability," unless it "is in furtherance of a compelling governmental
interest and is the least restrictive means of furthering that compelling government
interest."31 7 Accordingly, under the RFRA and its progeny, organizations with discrimi-
natory policies or practices have a "constitutional right to religious accommodation"
permitting them to disregard a subsidy's nondiscrimination condition while continuing
to receive the subsidy.318
In addressing the effect of the RFRA, Volokh posed a significant issue: whether
the government's refusal to subsidize discrimination based on religious beliefs or
tenets constitutes a "substantial burden" on free exercise.3'9 For example, in Bob
Jones University, decided prior to Smith, the Supreme Court found that although the
revocation of tax exemption could have a "substantial impact" on private religious
schools' operation, it "will not prevent those schools from observing their religious
tenets."32° The Court further determined that the government's interest in eliminating
racial discrimination in education "substantially outweighs whatever burden denial of
tax benefits" placed on the university's free exercise rights.32" ' Nevertheless, Volokh
concluded that under these pre-Smith cases, and thus presently under the RFRA, an
312 See supra notes 290-94 and accompanying text.
3 Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 878 (1990).
314 Edward McGlynn Gaffney, Jr., Full and Free Exercise of Religion, in RELIGIOUS
ORGANIZATIONS IN THE UNITED STATES, supra note 121, at 773, 803.
... Volokh, supra note 259, at 1949-50.
316 Edward McGlynn Gaffney, Jr., Full and Free Exercise of Religion, in RELIGIOUS
ORGANIZATIONS IN THE UNITED STATES, supra note 121, at 803.
"' Volokh, supra note 259, at 1950 & n.117 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-l(a), (b)); see
also Hatfield et al., supra note 48, at 73 ("Congress made clear in its declaration of findings
and purposes that the purpose of the law was to force the courts to utilize the compelling
interest test in all cases in which the free exercise of religion is substantially burdened.").
318 Volokh, supra note 259, at 1950.
319 Id. at 1954. Volokh also addressed the issue of when the "exercise of religion" is impli-
cated and by whom, thus triggering the statutory right to accommodation. See id. at 1951-54.320 Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S. 574, 603-04 (1982).
321 Id. at 604.
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organization which engaged in discrimination as a religious practice would likely
continue to receive subsidies if the government did not have a compelling interest to
"trump the religious freedom right," such as an interest in eradicating sexual orienta-
tion discrimination.322 But, as to a compelling governmental interest, Volokh flipped
that statement on its head and asked "whether the government has a compelling in-
terest in refusing to fund the discrimination, even if it lacks a compelling interest in
prohibiting the discrimination., 323 Although concluding that both pre-Smith free ex-
ercise case law and the RFRA and its state progeny provide little, if any, answers,324
he opined that an interest in not funding discrimination was likely not compelling.3 5
Although Volokh initially concluded that it was difficult to determine whether a dis-
criminating organization would prevail under a RFRA-based claim, he nevertheless
predicted that such an organization would likely not prevail if the issue of its right to
receive government subsidies were before the Supreme Court.326
In conclusion, Volokh asserted that an organization's loss of governmental sub-
sidies as a result of its discriminatory practices would not be a "terribly dire" con-
sequence. 327 First, such organizations can frequently obtain subsidies through the
politically driven legislative process.328 For example, if the proposed nondiscrimina-
tion requirement set forth in this Article were imposed on tax exemption under §
501(c)(3), the government would likely succumb to political pressure and exempt
churches. 329 Second, Volokh concluded practically that discriminating organizations
that lose their eligibility for receiving deductible contributions "will be no worse off
than lobbying or electioneering organizations, many of which thrive despite their
lack of tax-exempt status. "330
2. Establishment Clause
Most people associate the First Amendment's Establishment Clause with pro-
hibiting the government from favoring one religion over another, not necessarily with
justification for tax exemption.331 Because religious organizations are regulated by
the government as tax-exempt organizations, the Establishment Clause is necessarily
322 Volokh, supra note 259, at 1956 (citing Boy Scouts of Am. v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640,
658-59 (2000)); see also DeSantis v. Pac. Tel. & Tel. Co., 608 F.2d 327,333 (9th Cir. 1979)
("The courts have not designated homosexuals a 'suspect' or 'quasi-suspect' classification so
as to require more exacting scrutiny of classifications involving homosexuals.").
323 Volokh, supra note 259, at 1963.
324 id.
325 Id. at 1964.
326 Id. at 1951, 1968.
327 Id. at 1924.
328 Id. at 1924, 1967.
329 Id. at 1967.
330 Id. at 1924, 1967.
3 Halcom, supra note 271, at 752; Thomas, supra note 228, at 627.
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implicated,332 specifically, the "no excessive government entanglement" prong of a
three-part test utilized by the Supreme Court in addressing establishment issues.333
In Lemon v. Kurtzman, the Supreme Court determined that a state program that
provided financial assistance to parochial schools for the teaching of secular subjects
was unconstitutional under the Establishment Clause.334 In reaching its conclusion,
the Court announced a three-prong test assembled from its previous Establishment
Clause cases.335 Under Lemon, any state program or law (1) must have a secular pur-
pose; (2) its principal or primary effect must neither advance nor inhibit religion; and
(3) it must not promote or foster an "excessive government entanglement with reli-
gion. 336 If a tax (or an exemption from tax) is broadly applicable and religiously
neutral, as in Jimmy Swaggart Ministries,337 then the first two prongs of the Lemon
test are generally not implicated. It is typically the third prong's prohibition on ex-
cessive entanglement between the government and religion that is likely implicated
by any tax imposed on, or restriction on an exemption granted to, religious organiza-
tions. 3 8 For example, in Lemon, the state's ability to "inspect and evaluate" the paro-
chial school's financial records for purposes of ascertaining religious and secular ex-
penditures created, according to the Court, "an intimate and continuing relationship
between church and state. 3
39
In a decision handed down concurrently with Lemon, the Supreme Court iden-
tified several factors that could lead to excessive entanglement, namely, a continuing
332 HOPKINs, supra note 48, § 10.1(a)(ii).
333 Id. (specifically articulating the entanglement as "sponsorship, financial support, and
active involvement of the sovereign in religious activity" (quoting Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403
U.S. 602, 612 (1971))).
334 403 U.S. 602, 608-09, 613-14 (1971).
31 Id. at 612.
336 Id. at 612-13 (quoting Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664,674 (1970)). The Supreme
Court's decision in Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203 (1997), updated the application of the
three-part test announced in Lemon. Under Agostini, the third prong's prohibition on exces-
sive entanglement is considered, but only as it relates to the second prong's neutral effect
requirement. Id. at 232-33. See William P. Marshall, Constitutional Coherence and the Legal
Structures of American Churches, in RELIGIOUS ORGANIZATIONS IN THE UNITED STATES,
supra note 121, at 759, 762 & n.17; see also Halcom, supra note 271, at 752-53 & n.170.
337 493 U.S. at 389-90, 392; see supra notes 295-96 and accompanying text.
338 Halcom, supra note 271, at 752. However, with respect to the second Lemon prong,
the breadth of the property tax exemption in Walz-"real estate owned by a wide array of
nonprofit organizations"-was crucial to the Court's ultimately sustaining the exemption.
Tex. Monthly, Inc. v. Bullock, 489 U.S. 1, 11 (1989) (referring to Walz); see also Edward A.
Zelinsky, Are Tax "Benefits "for Religious Institutions Constitutionally Dependent on Benefits
forSecularEntities?, 42 B.C.L. REv. 805,823 (2001) (remarking on the similarities between
Justice Brennan's majority opinion in Texas Monthly and his concurrence in Walz).
339 Lemon, 403 U.S. at 621-22; see also Edward McGlynn Gaffney, Jr., Exemption of
Religious Communities from State and Local Taxation, in RELIGIOUS ORGANIZATIONS IN THE
UNrrED STATES, supra note 121, at 502-03; Thomas, supra note 228, at 628.
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financial relationship between government and the religious organization, annual
financial audits of the organization, and government scrutiny of the organization's
religious versus secular expenditures.' However, in Lemon, the Court conceded that
"[slome relationship [or entanglement] between government and religious organiza-
tions is inevitable."" Accordingly, in subsequent decisions with respect to excessive
entanglement, the Court has sanctioned generally applicable administrative and record-
keeping requirements, 342 "routine regulatory interaction [such as application of neutral
tax laws] which involves no inquiries into religious doctrine,"343 and fire inspections
and building and zoning regulations.' In Walz v. Tax Commission, the Supreme
Court upheld a state property tax exemption for churches and other secular charitable
organizations, acknowledging that "[g]ranting tax exemptions to churches necessarily
operates to afford an indirect economic benefit and also gives rise to some, but yet
a lesser, involvement than taxing them."345 Therefore, in comparing taxation of
churches with granting them tax exemption, the Court observed that the latter results
in less entanglement than the former. 346
However, a religious-organization-based exemption does not always yield reduced
entanglement. In Texas Monthly, Inc. v. Bullock, the Court determined that a state tax
exemption granted only to religious publications violated the Establishment Clause.47
In addition to constituting a "statutory preference for the dissemination of religious
ideas, 348 the narrow exemption also raised excessive entanglement issues. As in his
3" Tilton v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 672,688 (1971). Tilton involved governmental grants,
pursuant to Title I of the Higher Education Facilities Act of 1963, to several church-related
colleges for purposes of constructing buildings to be used for secular purposes. Id. at 674-75.
The Tilton Court distinguished the case from Lemon on the basis that colleges and univer-
sities, unlike elementary and secondary schools, are subject to less "sectarian influence." Id.
at 685-86. However, the Court did invalidate a provision of the Act that limited the religious
prohibition on buildings funded under the Act to twenty years, concluding that the possible
religious use after that time period advanced religion in violation of the Establishment Clause.
Id. at 683; see also Thomas, supra note 228, at 628.
141 Tilton, 403 U.S. at 614; see also Halcom, supra note 271, at 753.
342 Hernandez v. Comm'r, 490 U.S. 680, 696-97 (1989); see also Jimmy Swaggart
Ministries v. Bd. of Equalization, 493 U.S. 378, 394 (1990).
3" Hernandez, 490 U.S. at 696-97.
3' Lemon, 403 U.S. at 614.
341 397 U.S. 664, 674-75 (1970).
3 Id. at 676 ("The exemption creates only a minimal and remote involvement between
church and state and far less than taxation of churches."); see also Halcom, supra note 271,
at 753.
347 489 U.S. 1, 25 (1989). The Texas statute exempted from sales tax all "[p]eriodicals that
are published or distributed by a religious faith and that consist wholly of writings promulgating
the teaching of the faith and books that consist wholly of writing sacred to a religious faith."
Id. at 5 (quoting TEx. TAX CODE ANN. § 151.312 (1982)); see also Budlong v. Graham, 414
F. Supp. 2d 1222 (N.D. Ga. 2006) (declaring unconstitutional a sales tax exemption available
only to religious organizations).
348 Texas Monthly, 489 U.S. at 28 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
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Walz concurrence, Justice Brennan's plurality opinion in Texas Monthly concentrated
on the breadth of the tax exemption. 49 The Court ultimately concluded that the nar-
row exemption created greater state entanglement because it required public officials
to determine the religious message or nature of the publications sold.350
By contrast, in Jimmy Swaggart Ministries, the Supreme Court concluded that
the imposition of sales and use tax did not constitute unconstitutional entanglement
between the state of California and the Ministries, a religious organization.35' The
organization argued that the imposition of the tax on its sale of religious materials re-
sulted in on-site inspections and prolonged on-site audits, examinations of its financial
records, threats of criminal prosecution, and numerous administrative and judicial
proceedings. Disputing the Ministries' factual assertions as to the state's entangle-
ment, the Court concluded that "even assuming that the tax imposes substantial ad-
ministrative burdens on appellant, such administrative and recordkeeping burdens
do not rise to a constitutionally significant level., 353 Because of the tax's secular pur-
pose, general applicability, and failure to advance or inhibit religion, the Court con-
cluded that the Establishment Clause's "core values are not even remotely called into
question.' '354 Finally, the Court found most significant and persuasive the lack of re-
quired state inquiry into the religious nature of the items sold due to the tax's general
applicability.355 "From the State's point of view," stated the Court, "the critical ques-
tion is not whether the materials are religious, but whether there is a sale or a use,
a question which involves only a secular determination. 356
In specifically addressing Establishment Clause concerns raised by a nondiscrimi-
nation condition under the Lemon test, Professor Volokh observed that applying such
a condition to all organizations receiving a subsidy, including religious ones, has an
obvious secular purpose and does not primarily inhibit a particular religion.357 Volokh
I d. at 12 (majority opinion); see also Zelinsky, supra note 338.
350 Texas Monthly, 489 U.S. at 20.
151 Jimmy Swaggart Ministries v. Bd. of Equalization, 493 U.S. 378, 396-97 (1990).
352 Id. at 392.
313 Id. at 394-95 (citing Hernandez v. Comm'r, 490 U.S. 680,696-97 (1989) ("[R]outine
regulatory interaction [such as application of neutral tax laws] which involves no inquiries into
religious doctrine.... no delegation of state power to a religious body... and no 'detailed
monitoring and close administrative contact' between secular and religious bodies.... does
not of itself violate the nonentanglement command.")).
314 Id. at 394.
315 Id. at 396.
356 Id.
311 Volokh, supra note 259, at 1945 (quoting Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S.
574, 604 n.30 (1983)). In response to the University's contention that the denial of its tax-
exempt status violated the Establishment Clause because it preferred "religions whose tenets
do not require racial discrimination over those which believe racial intermixing is forbidden,"
the Supreme Court stated that "a regulation does not violate the Establishment Clause merely
because it 'happens to coincide or harmonize with the tenets of some or all religions.' The
IRS policy at issue here is founded on a 'neutral, secular basis,' and does not violate the
Establishment Clause." Bob Jones Univ., 461 U.S. at 604 n.30 (citations omitted).
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opined that entanglement issues will likely arise in the context of enforcing anti-
discrimination laws or provisions, especially with respect to the hiring of clergy and
other churches' leaders.358 While acknowledging the Supreme Court's decision in
NLRB v. Catholic Bishop of Chicago, which addressed the potentially unconstitutional
application of the National Labor Relations Act to teachers in religious schools,359 he
recognized the trend of lower courts to permit the application of anti-discrimination
law to such teachers.3 ° In such cases, he explained, the courts have determined that
applying anti-discrimination law narrowly concentrates on particular hiring decisions,
resulting in lesser amounts of entanglement than the broader sweep and involvement
of labor law.36' After vacillating about the potentially excessive entanglement result-
ing from the fact-finding required as to employment decisions, Volokh ultimately
concluded:
[P]erhaps the antientanglement principle of the Establishment
Clause counsels against closely scrutinizing groups' claims that
they do not discriminate in clergy hiring and accepting groups'
self-certification on the subject. But when they discriminate
overtly, then the government can deny them a subsidy-along-
side any other groups that discriminate-without excessively
entangling itself with religious decisionmaking.362
Another legal commentator, Kenneth Halcom, uniquely approached the constitu-
tional issues raised in this Article in the context of imposing a federal income tax on
religious organizations.' Although he addressed the Free Exercise Clause and other
constitutional concerns, his analysis predominantly focused on the Establishment
Clause. Taking into account the extensive connections between the government and
religious organizations under current federal income tax law, Halcom concluded
that the imposition of an income tax would not necessarily involve additional en-
tanglements, but rather would significantly expand the ones that currently exist.3'
Accordingly, he concluded that an income tax would foster excessive governmental
entanglement with religion under a Lemon analysis, thereby violating the Establishment
358 Volokh, supra note 259, at 1946-47 (citing EEOC v. Catholic Univ. of Am., 83 F.3d
343, 462 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (finding that churches have the "fundamental right... to 'decide
for themselves, free from state interference, matters of church government as well as those of
faith and doctrine"' (citation omitted))).
319 440 U.S. 490, 502 (1979).
" Volokh, supra note 259, at 1947.
361 See id. (quoting Geary v. Visitation of the Blessed Virgin Mary Parish Sch., 7 F.3d 324,
328 (3d Cir. 1993) (stating that labor law would "inject the Board into 'nearly everything'
that occurs in a religious school")).
362 Id. at 1949.
363 See Halcom, supra note 271.
'64 Id. at 760.
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Clause.365 The logical corollary to this conclusion, therefore, is that the Constitution
requires religious organizations to be exempt from income tax.36
However, Halcom astutely noted that the Constitution does not necessarily
require that religious organizations be granted exemption of the kind statutorily
provided by § 501 (c)(3).367 A religious organization, therefore, need not be eligible
to receive deductible charitable contributions or to issue tax-exempt bonds.368 By
drawing a distinction between constitutionally required and statutorily granted
exemptions, Halcom contended that the IRS could revoke a religious organization's
tax-exempt status under § 501(c)(3) for violating one of its statutory conditions
without implicating any constitutional issues, provided the IRS "does not seek to
recover income taxes" from that organization pursuant to § 61.369 Therefore,
Congress may place limitations on § 501(c)(3) tax-exempt status without constitu-
tional implications provided the religious organization is not ultimately required to
pay income tax.370 Accordingly, under his analysis, Halcom would phrase the issue
raised in this Article not as whether a religious organization that discriminates
should continue to be tax-exempt, but whether donors to that organization should
continue to deduct their contributions under § 170 and whether the organization
should continue to be eligible for tax-exempt financing under § 145.371
C. Analysis
In determining the constitutionality of imposing a nondiscrimination require-
ment on the tax exemption of religious organizations under § 501 (c)(3), the analysis
seems to focus primarily on the Establishment Clause. With respect to free speech
or associational rights under the First Amendment, case law consistently supports
the notion that tax exemption is a privilege, not a right, and that Congress can
choose to not subsidize certain activities, such as lobbying or involvement in
political campaigns.3 72 However, to date, the Supreme Court has not addressed
whether denying or revoking an organization's tax-exempt status based on its
discriminatory membership policy or other exclusionary practice violates that
organization's First Amendment rights to expressive association.373 Nevertheless,
365 Id. at 762.
366 id. at 766.
367 Id. at 767.
368 See id. at 767-68.
369 Id. at 767. He also notes that "[flor substantially the same reasons, Congress may at any
time repeal section 501(c)(3) and the entire tax-exemption regime." Id. at 767 n.254. Further-
more, if an organization engages in excessive lobbying or political campaign activities, it will
lose its "religious character and its corresponding First Amendment protection." Id. at 767.
370 Id. at 768.
371 Id. at 773.
372 See supra notes 229-58 and accompanying text.
373 See Brennen, supra note 225; Mirkay, Charities & Discrimination, supra note 5, at 72.
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the Court has sustained limitations on other First Amendment rights of charitable
organizations as a condition to tax exemption under § 501 (c)(3), 374 in part due to the
ability of those organizations to qualify for tax exemption under § 501(c)(4) as
social welfare organizations. 375 This is the constitutional safe harbor to which
Justice Blackmun alluded in his Regan concurrence.376
The Free Exercise Clause also should not be implicated because the proposed
nondiscrimination requirement would be broadly applied to all nonprofits seeking
or maintaining tax-exempt status under § 501(c)(3) and would be religiously
neutral.377 Furthermore, the nondiscrimination requirement does not constitute a
prior restraint on the free exercise of religious beliefs in that it does not attempt to
prohibit or prevent the observance of religious beliefs, as in Murdock or Follett.37 8
Rather, it only limits the benefits conferred under § 501(c)(3) in addition to tax
exemption-the charitable contributions deduction and the ability to issue tax-
exempt bonds. Even if the nondiscrimination requirement was asserted to be a
substantial burden on an organization's free exercise of its religious beliefs, as in
Branch Ministries, the revocation or denial of exemption would likely be viewed as
a non-constitutionally significant burden,379 especially with respect to churches
where the impact would be "more symbolic than substantial. '380 Nevertheless, the
RFRA and its state progeny do raise some perplexing free exercise questions, the
answers to which can only be hypothesized currently by a preeminent constitutional
law scholar.38  The uncertainty surrounding a RFRA-based free exercise claim
ostensibly supports this Article's conclusion of exempting a "church"-as a nar-
rowly defined term-from the proposed nondiscrimination requirement. It will
specifically avoid any excessive entanglement with respect to the hiring of clergy
and other employees that implement the church's purely religious functions.
... For instance, the Court has upheld statutory limitations under § 501 (c)(3) on religious
and other charitable organizations' lobbying and political campaign activities. See supra notes
230-58 and accompanying text.
... See supra note 56. One could argue, however, that discriminatory policies or practices
conflict with the regulatory definition of social welfare:
An organization is operated exclusively for the promotion of social wel-
fare if it is primarily engaged in promoting in some way the common good
and general welfare of the people of the community. An organization
embraced within this section is one which is operated primarily for the
purpose of bringing about civic betterments and social improvements.
Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(4)-1(a)(2)(I) (as amended in 1990).
376 See supra notes 242-43 and accompanying text.
37 See supra notes 279-311 and accompanying text.
378 See supra notes 286-87 and accompanying text.
... See supra note 309 and accompanying text.
380 See supra note 310 and accompanying text.
381 See Volokh, supra note 259, at 1963--64; see also Eugene Volokh, Intermediate
Questions of Religious Exemptions-A Research Agenda with Test Suites, 21 CARDOZO L.
REv. 595, 610-13, 630-34 (1999).
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With respect to a nondiscrimination restriction on § 501(c)(3) exemption, the
primary issue ostensibly involves the Establishment Clause-namely, whether such
a restriction would constitute "excessive government entanglement with religion. 382
Under current federal income tax law, "extensive connections" exist between religious
organizations and the government via the IRS.383 These connections include (1) an
application for recognition of exemption (except churches), 38' (ii) record retention
requirements,385 (iii) an annual information return (except churches), 386 (iv) with-
holding taxes on employees,387 (v) payment of unrelated business income tax,388 and
(vi) statutory limitations on exemption-prohibition on private inurement and political
campaign activities and limitations on lobbying.389 Of course, the connections with
churches are far less extensive because churches are generally only subject to with-
holding tax and unrelated business income tax requirements.
Therefore, would an additional restriction limiting a religious organization's
policies and practices increase these connections to a level that constitutes "exces-
sive entanglement," thus triggering Establishment Clause problems? According to
Halcom, Congress may place limitations on § 501(c)(3) income tax exemption with-
out constitutional implications, provided the religious organization retains its consti-
tutionally required exemption.39' In other words, the organization is not ultimately
required to pay income tax under § 61 even if its exemption is denied or revoked.
Professor Volokh was less confident about a non-entanglement result in such con-
texts, ultimately concluding that caution should be exercised particularly with re-
spect to hiring clergy and that organizations' claims that they do not discriminate in
such contexts should be accepted generally at face value.392 Once again, Volokh's
conclusion ostensibly supports this Article's judgment to exercise caution and
exempt a "church"-as a more narrowly defined term-from the proposed nondis-
crimination requirement.
382 Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602,612-13 (1971) (quoting Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397
U.S. 664, 674 (1970)).
383 Halcom, supra note 271, at 756.
384 I.R.C. § 508 (2000).
385 I.R.S. Announcement 94-111, 1994-37 I.R.B. 36; see also I.R.S., TAX GUIDE FOR
CHURCHES AND RELIGIOUS ORGANIZATIONS 20 (2008), http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-pdf/pl 828
.pdf [hereinafter TAX GUIDE].
386 I.R.C. § 6033.
387 TAX GUIDE, supra note 385, at 18-19.
388 See I.R.C. §§ 511-514. Although originally exempt, churches have been subject to the
unrelated business income tax since the Tax Reform Act of 1969. See supra note 135 and
accompanying text.
389 See supra notes 76, 82-85 and accompanying text.
" Halcom, supra note 271, at 758.
191 Id. at 766.
31 Volokh, supra note 259, at 1946.
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CONCLUSION
With respect to the separation of church and state, contemporary legal scholars
astutely observe the implausibility of separating church and state in modem times:
"Church and state are not separate in the United States, and could not possibly be sep-
arate. The question is not whether the state should be permitted to affect religion,
or religion permitted to affect the state; the question is how they should be permitted
to affect each other. 39 3 This Article addressed the latter question of how religious
organizations, including churches, and the government should affect each other in the
context of tax exemption and public benefit. Specifically, it proposed a broad nondis-
crimination condition on tax-exempt status under § 501(c)(3). A religious organi-
zation should not continue to enjoy the benefits of that tax-exempt status if it engages
in discrimination, because it is intrinsically incompatible with its purpose and mission
as a charitable organization.
A nondiscrimination requirement in § 501 (c)(3) presents a more comprehensive
solution to the problem of discriminatory policies and practices in religious organi-
zations than any expanded application of the public-policy doctrine or current civil
rights laws. It would send a strong message that discrimination is fundamentally incon-
sistent with tax-exempt status under § 501(c)(3), thereby bolstering "the commonly
held view that discrimination is generally wrong and thus generally should not be sub-
sidized by the government .... , The intent of a statutorily imposed nondiscrimina-
tion condition is not to control or regulate religious beliefs, but to eliminate the use
of tax-deductible dollars, and other benefits received by religious organizations pur-
suant to § 501 (c)(3), to support or maintain discrimination against members of society.
Because this Article focused on religious organizations and churches, its proposal
creates many challenges, primarily constitutional in nature. Nevertheless, by permitting
discriminatory organizations to qualify as tax-exempt social-welfare organizations
under § 501(c)(4), a nondiscrimination condition on § 501(c)(3) tax-exempt status
should alleviate any First Amendment free speech or association concerns. In an
attempt to avoid any potential Free Exercise or Establishment Clause concerns,
churches, as a narrowly defined subset of religious organizations, should be excepted
from the nondiscrimination requirement. The definition of a church, however, should
be confined to the IRS fifteen-point test395 with a particular emphasis on the criterion
of an established and dynamic congregation. In addition, Congress should likewise
narrow a religious organization's eligibility for "integrated auxiliary" status, thereby
'" Richard W. Garnett, Religion and Group Rights: Are Churches (Just) Like the Boy
Scouts?, 22 ST. JoHN'S J. LEGAL COMMENT. 515, 519 (2007) (quoting CHRISTOPHER L.
EISGRUBER & LAWRENCE G. SAGER, RELIGIOUS FREEDOM AND THE CONsTTrUTION 6-7
(2006)).
" Volokh, supra note 259, at 1934.
'9' See supra note 104 and accompanying text.
2009]
WILLIAM & MARY BILL OF RIGHTS JOURNAL
limiting the organizations functionally treated as churches under the Code. By
statutorily limiting an integrated auxiliary's non-church funding to twenty percent
or less, Congress would be providing "a fair, objective test ... without questioning the
religious nature of any particular organization., 396 Furthermore, a lower non-church-
funding threshold would accomplish Congress's objective of subjecting more tax-
exempt organizations to public disclosure and inspection.
Although this Article proposes some solutions, its primary intent is to further the
dialogue on how best to resolve the inherent tension that exists when government pro-
vides tax benefits to discriminatory organizations. As one legal scholar explained,
"We do not in the abstract resolve the tension between respecting religious groups
and ensuring each individual protection against discrimination; nor do we resolve it
quickly. Instead, we struggle over time, in courts, legislatures, private settings, and
complex negotiations." '397 Perhaps this dialogue and struggle will compel religious
organizations to accentuate differences less and utilize the benefits of their tax-
exempt status more to further social justice and combat social ills such as poverty
and hunger, which know no boundaries of age, gender, religion, race, ethnicity, or
sexual orientation.
'96 STAFF OF JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, 98TH CONG., GENERAL EXPLANATION OF THE
REVENUE PROVISIONS OF THE DEFIcrr REDUCTION ACT 1214 (Comm. Print 1984).
" Minow, supra note 184, at 848.
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